I think a problem in your analysis is that the miners are the equivalent of the Fed, not the developers. The developers are technical experts on whom the miners rely for tools, but are not the equivalent of the substantive decision makers.
But the bigger problem, whether you view miners or miners+developers as parallel to the Fed, is that you've failed present any argument or evidence supporting your key point, to wit, that the "few" who form the "government of bitcoin" (by your description) are somehow inherently "limited in their ability to be corrupt".
The Fed makes the rules. The banks/people perform the actions under those rules that create economic activity in the US.
The Developers make the rules. The miners perform the actions under those rules that create economic activity in the Bitcoin markets.
Say the Fed is corrupt/stupid and enacts a bad policy. The banks/people have no choice but to accept the decision of the Fed. Theoretically you could emigrate, but that is neither desirable nor feasible for the majority of the population.
Say the developers are corrupt/stupid and decide to raise the Bitcoin cap to 30 billion and lower the difficulty, effectively hyperinflating the currency. The mining community has the choice to either a) not accept the changes to the client or b) to vote with their digital feet by moving to another cryptocurrency. They are more likely to choose a) assuming they've been mining for a while/have a reserve of Bitcoin.
The key is that the miners "rely [on the developers] for tools" as you put it. The tools = the client = the rules of the game. So the developers make the rules and the miners decide whether or not to play by them.
But the bigger problem, whether you view miners or miners+developers as parallel to the Fed, is that you've failed present any argument or evidence supporting your key point, to wit, that the "few" who form the "government of bitcoin" (by your description) are somehow inherently "limited in their ability to be corrupt".