I guess Lavabit figured that giving access to the data of one user in the requested way could compromise other users' privacy/security so that would be equal to warrantless wiretapping. Otherwise, what was the problem with following that?
The problem was that following it would be a violation of the privacy of Edward Snowden (well, of the user whom we presume to be Snowden) and of the trust which he had placed in Lavabit.
Violation of his privacy under warrant is what the law would expect in that case. Violating privacy without a warrant (and probable cause and etc.), that what is unconstitutional. Or you are saying that there can be no investigation at all?
Lavabit even admitted, they already assisted investigators in the past for investigation on a specific user. Apparently that request was legal in the view of the Lavabit owner, so there should be something different here.
From the article:
> With the SSL keys, and a wiretap, the FBI could have decrypted all web sessions between Lavabit users and the site.
It sounds like he was incurring some significant fines as well, so he was left with the choice of undermining his entire business model, or closing down.
It looks from the article, that they didn't request keys right away, but wanted some other kind of access to target Snowden. There are no details however what that was. SSL keys request already came when Lavabit refused the first one.
I was talking about that unclear first request above.
Circumventing their whole system's security is a step beyond "wiretapping." It opens all customer communications of a supposedly secure service to inspection by an agency that doesn't recognize legal bounds. LI interfaces are usually rate-limited (IIRC the legal requirement in most places is 1% of traffic).
