They exercise adjudicatory powers that Congress could otherwise provide to be handled directly by the executive or private bills. When a case involves an actual Article III issue, Article I courts need to kick it over to an Article III tribunal: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/462/
The terms “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” do not mean “judicial” and “legislative,” they mean “executive.” For example, the legal fiction allowing executive agencies to make rules is that those rules are simply structuring what they could do with executive authority anyway.
So separation of powers actually cuts in the opposite direction with respect to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. So when the SEC prosecutes you in front of an ALJ for violating an SEC rule, it isn’t actually exercising judicial or legislative powers. It’s just laying out those structures for what it could do through some guy making an executive decision. That’s the only reason the SEC is constitutional. Given that, Congress shouldn’t be able to limit the President’s supervision over what’s notionally an exercise of executive power.
P.S. Regarding the SEC, SEC v Jarkesy (2024) curtailed the use of ALJs by the SEC, holding that the SEC proceedings in question were basically like any other lawsuit so as to trigger the Constitutional protections afforded to defendants. If the Sup Ct goes down the unitary executive route, SEC v Jarkesy should be the first of many cases to challenge the structure of federal agencies.
The administrative law proceeding is a judicial proceeding. Its purpose is to determine whether someone has violated the rules created by the SEC. It's fundamentally no different than a court proceeding to determine whether someone has violated the criminal code. Both are trying to decide "were the rules broken, and if so, what should be the penalty?"
A fundamental principle in any legal system is that no one can be the judge in his own case. But if the ALJs and the SEC rulemakers are under the direct control of the president, then the president is effectively performing legislation, prosecution, and adjudication all at once. The president could keep sacking ALJs until he finds one willing to issue his favored ruling. That is precisely the kind of scenario that separation of powers seeks to avert.
> The administrative law proceeding is a judicial proceeding
It is structured like a judicial proceeding, but it is not a judicial proceeding in the sense that it doesn't exercise the "judicial power." For example, everyone agrees that determining violations of criminal laws is an exercise of judicial power. So the SEC cannot prosecute you in front of an ALJ and impose criminal penalties. SEC v. Jarkesy also held that the SEC cannot impose civil penalties in front of an ALJ: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11229.
On the other hand, Congress can create a procedure in an executive agency that looks like a judicial proceeding, so long as it only does what an executive agency could do anyway. In Oil States, the Supreme Court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal board was constitutional, because patents were a "public right" that could be determined by the executive branch: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf. A Patent Examiner can grant you a patent and can revoke an already-granted patent. That's an executive function. Back in 1790, Thomas Jefferson was doing that himself as Secretary of State. So Congress can create a court-like proceeding in the Patent Office to challenge a patent's validity, and that's fine because the result is something the executive branch could do anyway. It's not an exercise of the judicial power.
> But if the ALJs and the SEC rulemakers are under the direct control of the president, then the president is effectively performing legislation, prosecution, and adjudication all at once... That is precisely the kind of scenario that separation of powers seeks to avert.
Under your interpretation, the SEC is exercising legislative, executive, and adjudicatory powers all at once--regardless of how much supervisory authority the President has. You're correct that separation of powers seeks to avoid that. But the way it does not is not by creating agencies that exercise all those powers independent of the president. It does so by creating three branches of government, and requiring the executive, legislative, and judicial powers to be exercise by the respective branches. The problem you have identified is a problem with administrative agencies exercising legislative and judicial powers, not a problem with Presidential control over the executive branch.
They exercise adjudicatory powers that Congress could otherwise provide to be handled directly by the executive or private bills. When a case involves an actual Article III issue, Article I courts need to kick it over to an Article III tribunal: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/462/
The terms “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” do not mean “judicial” and “legislative,” they mean “executive.” For example, the legal fiction allowing executive agencies to make rules is that those rules are simply structuring what they could do with executive authority anyway.
So separation of powers actually cuts in the opposite direction with respect to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. So when the SEC prosecutes you in front of an ALJ for violating an SEC rule, it isn’t actually exercising judicial or legislative powers. It’s just laying out those structures for what it could do through some guy making an executive decision. That’s the only reason the SEC is constitutional. Given that, Congress shouldn’t be able to limit the President’s supervision over what’s notionally an exercise of executive power.