Because an essential enterprise security application was /able/ to bring down an entire OS like this. The issue is that Microsoft doesn't provide an interface for an application to operate in user-space to have the functionality it requires.
Linux has eBPF which can provide most of the capability that Crowdstrike needs, by using an "in-kernel verifier which performs static code analysis and rejects programs which crash, hang or otherwise interfere with the kernel negatively". If MS had this functionality, it is likely this incident would not have happened.
That said, from personal experience on Linux it's been an extremely long time since a bad kernel module has rendered a system entirely FUBAR'd.
> Linux has eBPF which can provide most of the capability that Crowdstrike needs, by using an "in-kernel verifier which performs static code analysis and rejects programs which crash, hang or otherwise interfere with the kernel negatively". If MS had this functionality, it is likely this incident would not have happened.
It didn't stop Linux machines from being down so it is clearly not as easy as you put it. The reality is that writing software is hard yet devs often trivialise it to their own detriment
The issue I am raising is /design/, not /development/. The current model of unconstrained unforgiving highly privileged execution space is a bad design, that is what eBPF tries to address.
It is a different issue[0]. The Linux issue from April was a Linux Kernel bug[1], that CS Falcon happened to trigger. The design to use eBPF is sound, but the implementation on the kernel side had a bug.
Also, CS Falcon didn't support RHEL 9.4 (only up to 9.3), so for this specific bug you highlighted, CS should not be held accountable for regression testing, because it was a platform they did not support.
With Windows, the design is currently poor to not be able to run code in a safe manner. Most recently, it appears MS is blaming the EU for forcing them to create an interface for services such as CS to run[2]. Rather than lean into the problem and create a good design, they didn't create security boundaries - risking the entire system.
Bugs happen, and Linux will continue to harden and be more resilient - but unless MS focussed on secure design in this area, things like this will continue to happen (same as they have with AV before).
Linux has eBPF which can provide most of the capability that Crowdstrike needs, by using an "in-kernel verifier which performs static code analysis and rejects programs which crash, hang or otherwise interfere with the kernel negatively". If MS had this functionality, it is likely this incident would not have happened.
That said, from personal experience on Linux it's been an extremely long time since a bad kernel module has rendered a system entirely FUBAR'd.
(To Microsoft credit, they have begun copying the eBPF methodoloy to Windows, but it is still in it's infancy https://github.com/Microsoft/ebpf-for-windows/ ).