So, some tech like that is used in Banknotes, although the specifics are often covered under extremely strict NDAs. Companies that offer these NDAs around often offer product that watermarks in non-visible spectra, so you might infer they do something similar in the central banking space. It's a fairly patent-heavy field; I wouldn't be surprised if your work is covered at least in part by industry patents. If you have the patents still, I'd probably try and market them to companies like Kurz which have built large profitable businesses doing security layers for printed goods, among many other things.
As you note, inks are a big deal, and control of inks and the ink supply chain can be a big deal.
I put a bunch of money into Noteworthy a few years ago, which successfully embedded ARM chips into banknotes, the proposal being that you could at-note security with challenge/response over NFC. Noteworthy picked Bitcoin notes as a first product/demo tech. They work, it's very cool tech, and, shockingly, the chip embedding part of the tech stack isn't even the most expensive part of making a banknote.
I also invested in a company looking at drug supply chains in low-data areas, which just used SMS-based single authentication checks (great idea -- didn't pan out), a company embedding chips in sneakers (great idea -- this one works, but it's not clear if it matters for mid-tier large issuance sneakers), ...
I spent the most time with Noteworthy, and learned the banknote folks think of authentication in three tiers: individual (e.g. can you or a checkout person at a gas-station tell a note is fake), retail (e.g. can a bank teller tell a note is fake), and redacted, (e.g. can Treasury tell a note is fake). This multi-tier approach is practical and sensible to me; in brief, the farther up the chain, the more power you can bring to bear on determining a fake, and the longer you can take.
I think the same dynamics are there in a lot of consumer goods -- and the upshot is that, at least in the states with consumer goods, people mostly want to / need to trust their supply chains; it's very rare anyone is going to even take a picture of something with their phone to check its authenticity.
As you note, inks are a big deal, and control of inks and the ink supply chain can be a big deal.
I put a bunch of money into Noteworthy a few years ago, which successfully embedded ARM chips into banknotes, the proposal being that you could at-note security with challenge/response over NFC. Noteworthy picked Bitcoin notes as a first product/demo tech. They work, it's very cool tech, and, shockingly, the chip embedding part of the tech stack isn't even the most expensive part of making a banknote.
I also invested in a company looking at drug supply chains in low-data areas, which just used SMS-based single authentication checks (great idea -- didn't pan out), a company embedding chips in sneakers (great idea -- this one works, but it's not clear if it matters for mid-tier large issuance sneakers), ...
I spent the most time with Noteworthy, and learned the banknote folks think of authentication in three tiers: individual (e.g. can you or a checkout person at a gas-station tell a note is fake), retail (e.g. can a bank teller tell a note is fake), and redacted, (e.g. can Treasury tell a note is fake). This multi-tier approach is practical and sensible to me; in brief, the farther up the chain, the more power you can bring to bear on determining a fake, and the longer you can take.
I think the same dynamics are there in a lot of consumer goods -- and the upshot is that, at least in the states with consumer goods, people mostly want to / need to trust their supply chains; it's very rare anyone is going to even take a picture of something with their phone to check its authenticity.