Basically, SFO normally does VFR parallel approaches at night. Approach sequences these approaches miles beforehand, so there can be a chain of 10-20 aircraft all sequenced to land before responsibility is even transferred to SFO's tower. The incident happened during a particularly busy landing time at SFO, so there was indeed a massive chain of aircraft coming in to land.
Lufthansa was the only aircraft asking for ILS. Because ILS needs greater separation, that would require breaking the chain of approaches, sequencing a single ILS approach, then resuming. The chain of landings already sequenced takes priority, so Lufthansa would have to wait 30+ minutes for a gap to appear. By the time that gap appeared, Lufthansa had just decided to divert to Oakland. If Lufthansa had arrived a bit earlier or a bit later, they would have been sequenced just fine.
ATC could have been a bit more accommodating in rerouting their divert to SFO as soon as the a gap appeared, but Lufthansa was also the only airline requesting ILS, and they're already dealing with sequencing 20+ aircraft during a busy time. It's not clear who's in the wrong here; just an unintended consequence from many well-intentioned decisions.
I think the FAA leadership is ultimately in the wrong for allowing their area of responsibility to deteriorate to the point where a controller and a pilot were put in this situation.
They have a controller shortage that they are not doing enough to fix, and they have a troublesome airport with limited capacity to accommodate traffic, that they are being too bureaucratic about fixing. The controllers at SFO have used a number of tools to address the handicap, but the FAA recently put a lid on that by forbidding side-by-side IFR/VFR approaches while also failing to authorize custom precision landing procedures like SOIA.
The request for ILS is entirely reasonable in this context, and the decision to hold the flight out of the sequence is also reasonable in the context, but to hold the flight with no updates for half an hour is not reasonable and to require it to divert is not reasonable either. The FAA should be held responsible for planning things better than this.
No, Lufthansa should not be dispatching flights to arrive at SFO at the busiest time of night if their pilots aren’t prepared to do the approaches everyone else is doing. This isn’t a foreign vs. domestic carrier thing. British Airways, Air India, EVA, etc. etc. all have pilots prepared to execute night visual approaches and do so every night at SFO.
- "their pilots aren’t prepared to do the approaches everyone else is doing"
Is this is a fair framing? My read of it is that Lufthansa's enforcing a minimal standard of safety—one that's higher than both other airliners' and the ATC's. They're not incapable of doing visual landings at night; rather, they have a policy banning it in non-emergency situations. It (naively) seems reasonable to me not to budge on this kind of thing. (Unless the inflexibility creates new forms of safety issues, in which case I have no idea).
Also, I'm mindful there was a recent near-disaster at SFO with exactly the issue this Lufthansa policy mitigates: a non-ILS landing attempt at night, which attempted the wrong runway due to confusion over visual markers,
Airline pilots can lose their jobs if they do not follow the airline's SOP (Standard Operating Procedure). SFO controllers have gotten a shitty rep, with good reason, it appears. This wouldn't have happened at any of the other many busy airports in the US. This seemed to be the majority opinion on a couple other forums where this has been discussed.
> This wouldn't have happened at any of the other many busy airports in the US.
I'm not aware of any other busy airport in the US that has the same parallel runway situation SFO has, with two parallel runways only 750 feet apart both doing landings. Plenty of other large US airports have parallel runways, but they're further apart and they're staggered between landings and takeoffs.
Sure, Lufthansa can make up whatever rules they want for “safety”. Safest would be to not venture 7 miles above the arctic at 500mph at all. But if their rules are obviously in conflict with the standard operations at an airport, it’s on Lufthansa to adjust not everyone else. You can’t barge in and expect to get ATC priority on account of “company policy” or suddenly there’d be a lot of company policies requiring only direct routings with straight-in approaches.
Let's keep in mind that SFOs "standard operations" is purely economical, it's about making more landings so the airport earns more money. Now you might be happy to compromise your safety so others can earn more money, I think many others are not.
It's also not like SFO doesn't have other LH flights arriving who all have the exact same rules, so it could've hardly come as a surprise.
Finally, the pilot was in some ways quite considerate. He could have just waited and declared a fuel emergency that would have really screwed things up for ATC.
He would be in the wrong to wait and then declare a fuel emergency. He’s supposed to divert once he reaches a certain level. Only if he then had some problem diverting would declaring a fuel emergency become a real option.
> Let's keep in mind that SFOs "standard operations" is purely economical, it's about making more landings so the airport earns more money.
Having more, and more regular, landings is also in the greater public interest, so long as you agree with air travel at all. If SFO changed their rules and could accommodate fewer landings, fewer people would get to travel to San Francisco and more of them would be delayed.
It seems bizarre to blame the airport for being profit seeking for having two runways and wanting to use them both to their maximum safe capacity. You might as well blame Lufthansa for the same thing - if they only operated one airliner, this issue would likely never have come up.
Why do automatic landings require wider separation than visual approaches? If anything, shouldn’t it allow for more dense approaches, since the computer has more situational awareness?
> Finally, the pilot was in some ways quite considerate. He could have just waited and declared a fuel emergency that would have really screwed things up for ATC.
Not really, he would have been sent packing very fast to OAK which is just 10NM from SFO.
They didn't "barge in" or expect any priority. They arrived just like everyone else. As a matter of fact, they travelled farther than probably most arrivals that day so ATC had much more warning they were approaching than, say, a flight from Denver or Atlanta
As I understand the sequence of events, the flight crew informed ATC that they couldn't execute a visual approach...when ATC cleared them for a visual approach. If they really couldn't do a visual approach due to company policy, one would think they would inform ATC of this earlier, to at least give some time to try to accommodate them. (Other commenters have said that this information might be filed with the flight plan, which if true would put more of the onus on ATC.)
If I recall from listening to the ATC conversation back at the time, the ATC acknowledged that they had received this information from Lufthansa in a phone call far ahead of the arrival.
Does ATC know your flight plan? My recollection from the Channel 9 days was that pilots requested whatever landing clearance they wanted when they pinged the appropriate ATC, but I’m neither a pilot nor ATC, so don’t know if there were processes I wasn’t seeing.
ATC knows the flight plan, but in the US (as opposed to Europe) the last few steps to the ground are generally not filed as part of the flight plan, but are negotiated when closer to landing. There are pros and cons of this, of course.
Describing this as "barging in" is rather strange to me. The aviation industry is neither a charity nor the average software engineering shop; not only is air traffic control something that airlines pay for, this is far from the first or the last time that Lufthansa will fly into SFO.
Now I am confused - I have no actual knowledge on this but on the post there is a comment from an experienced pilot saying the opposite:
> [...] But IMO ATC was absolutely not doing what they are supposed to do. Air traffic control is literally a service provided to and paid for by the airlines.
Let’s revisit this comment in 3 years when one of the increasing number of near misses has resulted in an accident.
I am usually the first to point out the cost of safety measures. But the increasing number of near-misses in the US suggests that it’s maybe not the time to brush off the risk.
You might be interested to know that the FAA doesn’t follow standard ICAO procedures for visual approach clearance. So when SFO “rules” are in conflict with how the entire rest of the world handles visual approach clearances, perhaps the FAA is the one that needs to get their act together.
In order to drive this point—What kind of arbitrary safety policies are ATCs to expect and service?
If there are 200 airlines landing at SFO, you surely cannot expect ATC to make exceptions and argue about this or that. We need upfront, transparent and written procedures and policies.
Luthansa should notify SFO of their requirements before departing. SFO would have the right to reject their "safety" policy. And we wouldn't have this sticky situation.
The air Canada issue can still be mitigated, even on a visual approach, by programming the plane for the runway’s instrument approach (ILS or otherwise) assuming one is available.
Many pilots do this, and you don’t need a special ILS clearance or its corresponding separation to do so.
I dunno. If everyone is doing 75 on the freeway, "safest" might be 65, but you can also create more unsafe conditions by not matching the speed of all the other traffic.
This is a very popular argument. I run into it a lot. I have been criticized for following the speed limit when there were six vehicles spaced across five kilometers. It seems I am expected to speed up to match the one vehicle that passed me.
If nobody obeys the speed limit and it is in fact safer to exceed the speed limit, why do we have speed limits? Why does the government make it illegal to do the safest thing? And why does the public put up with it? Why is there no MADD-like organization protesting the insane government policies that put everybody at risk?
I don't have any data to show that 65 is safer than 75, or to show that 75 is safer than 65. I don't know if speed limits are based on any real safety data. But I'm pretty sure that your rationalization is not. This is my little (misguided) campaign to combat that argument. Even if 95% of the population embrace it as a plausible excuse for breaking rules and to malign rule-keepers.
You are right to a certain point, but all you are required is to follow the airplane in front of you and land. It's a dumb simple requirement. If it was such a big issue, FAA would have put a stop to it at SFO, but just because one Air Canada flight tried to land on the taxiway does not make it a safety critical issue. Mistakes happen all the time.
Asking for an airport to break its arrival sequence because your airline has a different policy than the airport is bonkers.
Yes, mistakes happen all the time. One aspect of the aviation industry that I have always noted is the reluctance to adopt this as an excuse for failure. When a pilot pushes Button X instead of Button Y, it isn't just chalked up to pilot error. Somebody asks why Button X and Button Y are arranged right next to each other to begin with. Why was a situation created in which "pilot error" becomes so easy? Then things are changed so that such pilot error becomes harder and less likely.
It's an admirable thing when somebody has to go out of their way and go through some contortions to make critical mistakes.
Commercial pilot here. The Lufthansa prohibition on night visuals isn’t a new thing. Proper flow control when that airplane entered US airspace could have ensured correct spacing long before the aircraft entered ZOA (Oakland ARTCC) airspace. That NorCal approach expected to give the Lufthansa a night visual is puzzling because anyone that has worked in an approach control at night would know that it’s common for many operators especially biz jet operators and Lufthansa to have a operational prohibition on night visuals (many operators also have prohibitions on night circling approaches, but these aren’t common in large airliner airports.)
Flow Control is also part of the problem: they knew that aircraft was en route many hours before, they should have sequenced the airplane correctly. But this is also a result of staffing and priorities at the FAA. Buttigeg is essentially incompetent. A small town mayor of debatable accomplishment in even getting road potholes repaired being elevated to lead the U.S. Dept of Transportation was mind-blowing. If he deserved any cabinet role, HUD would have been the closest fit, but we all know that all presidents have a tendency to appoint people as political favors rather than subject-matter excellence.
Ask controllers and pilots who have been in this business for more than a few years and the giant belly-flop of the FAA is profound. Controllers are far less experienced and greatly overworked than they were pre-2020.
And interestingly, the FAA does not follow ICAO rules for visual approaches — the international standard requires consent of both the pilot and ATC — it’s not something that ATC initiates unilaterally. For those interested, here is a helpful document on the consequences of the FAA/ICAO differences: https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-...
And here is an article that is significantly more informed on this incident than some frequent flyer blog written by backseaters rather than aviation professionals:
"The flight was initially supposed to leave Munich at 4:20PM, but only departed at 6:30PM
The flight was supposed to arrive in San Francisco at 7PM, but ended up landing in Oakland at 9:43PM, after a 12hr13min flight"
Don't think they intended to arrive at the busiest time
FAA is completely asleep at the wheel in most areas it governs. Youtube is filled with ATC simply refusing to do their jobs, and under no circumstances should exchanges like this should be allowed to happen.
There's an ATC shortage, but so what? There's an even larger shortage of safety which needs to be addressed, and FAA are doing nothing at all.
From what I've read last week [0], the main problem is that there's not enough (qualified) candidates being hired, and current ATC employees are routinely working 6d x 10h weeks.
Stressed & overworked employees doesn't seem like a great solution to critical life/death situation either.
“I found the
diversity in hiring air traffic controllers increased after the termination of the AT-CTI. However
applicants in underrepresented groups are more likely to be lost through attrition in the FAA
Academy Air Traffic Controller Training Program.”
Pilots and controllers who are already in short supply? That’s the problem, the individual actors are helpless in a system optimized against them.
Certainly, the FAA is a contributing factor through wages and working conditions leading to controller shortages, but airlines can also do more to better accommodate pilots.
This is a system headed to failure, with those responsible not making responsible choices and who won’t be held accountable when failure occurs (hundreds of passenger air transport deaths).
The FAA (and specifically Transport Secretary Buttigieg) hold all the cards here. That they're not doing more to address the issues speaks volumes about the FAA's mission and abrogation of it.
Congress holds the purse strings but FAA makes the rules. And their rules are strict, limiting both populations. There is an ATC shortage and FAA’s rules make it difficult to hire/train enough ATC. There is a pilot shortage and FAA’s rules make it difficult to hire/train enough pilots. We need to either reduce our demand of pilots and airline travel, thus reducing the load on ATC, or train more controllers and pilots.
ATC has ridiculous age limits for onboarding and retiring staff, and there are a lot of things (aeromedical and otherwise) that can disqualify your from becoming a pilot. I think they can lighten up and still maintain aviation’s good safety record.
This is just another instance of the long set of Shittification and Shrinkflation happening everywhere, brought about by us holding our collective heads in the sand over the real rate of inflation. I'd bet it's a lot more than the official numbers.
FAAs 3B shortfall in funding is not appearing in the extra cost of running a government. They're "shrinking" or rather "shittifying" the service that the government provides by not hiring enough personnel required.
Aye. Increasing taxes is basically the only way to ensure the system is funded sufficiently to:
(1) hire enough people to perform the ops
(2) hire enough people to update and modernize the policy
Any other solution that doesn't emphasize building up the human capital is easy to argue against, IMO. You simply cannot draw from an empty well, and you really really don't want text GPTs attempting to land you no matter how well-intentioned the fine-tuning.
>> Increasing taxes is basically the only way to ensure the system is funded sufficiently
Making no judgement either way, its worth pointing out that there are other ways.
Firstly one could prioritise this over some other budget item. Perhaps, for example, the military budget (currently 766b) or the TSA budget (currently 11.2b, up 1.6b over last year.)
Secondly, one could restore taxes that have recently been cut. While this is indeed a "short term increase" it can also be framed as "a restoration of tax income recently removed."
Removed incidentally by a govt that was already running a deficit.
Again i make no judgement. All budgeting (at a personal or govt level) is about setting spending priorities. It just appears that safe air travel in the US is not a priority right now.
Because ATC has nothing to do with airports. The only people directly involved from the airports are GND/TWR. APP is not directly related and Centers cover large swaths of territory and just make sure planes fly safe.
The two runways that run in parallel are too close to each other to land side-by-side in bad weather (because they only allow using Visual aka VFR landings).
"SFO operates on two sets of parallel runways. On fair weather days, SFO can accommodate approximately 60 arrivals per hour. During periods of low visibility, current FAA safety regulations allow aircraft to arrive side-by-side only if runways are at least 4,300 feet apart."
There's a bunch of reasons but it's primarily the popularity of the airport combined with the runway layout and the noise abatement procedures all made worse by the Bay's weather.
SFO has two pairs of parallel runways and the pairs are very close together, with the runways in the 28L/28R pair only 750 feet apart. That's really close for an A350 with a giant 200ft wingspan and the noise abatement prevents the use of a standard step down approach where the pilots have much better visibility.
If I remember correctly, this Lufthansa flight usually arrives during the day, when the company permits visual approaches, but had a delayed departure, which is what let to their policy prohibiting visual approaches and the bad timing with the huge chain of other arrivals.
Sure, but my point is that this flight arriving in darkness is not something they never would have considered when planning the route and setting company policies prohibiting visual approaches at night.
The article is incorrect (no surprise, considering it's a blog hawking credit cards that offer bonus frequent flyer miles written by people who are not aviators or controllers or anything related).
The issue isn't the visual approach. Lufthansa can do visual approaches at night. What they can't do is maintain visual separation from other aircraft at night. They mentioned this is exactly what isn't allowed for them. I think perhaps they could have been accommodated better at SFO, but the plane landed in Oakland and everyone survived so it worked out.
There as nothing in the Lufthansa plans or policies that would make this flight or landing impossible, unreasonable or unsafe. I imagine this landing at night is not a first either.
> The FAA themselves recommend that foreign pilots do not use visual approaches at SFO.
In 2013, temporarily:
> They also can use an instrument system called a glide slope indicator, although that has been out of service in San Francisco since June 1 because of ongoing runway improvements.
> The FAA said all foreign carriers should continue to use alternate instrument approaches until the glide slopes return to service in late August.
Was that referring to the Primary Glide Slope Indicator being out of order at the time though? I find the article a little unclear if that's a general recommendation even if all the aids are functional for a visual approach.
One useful part of that video is how they play clips of ATC telling flights to “join the localizer”.
SFO has two published visual approaches (https://www.airnav.com/airport/KSFO, scroll to the bottom): Both visual approaches have pilots fly to intercept their runway’s localizer, the part of the ILS equipment that provides lateral positioning, relative to the localizer’s centerline (which is generally coincident to the corresponding runway’s centerline).
So, by flying the published visual approach and remaining “on the localizer”, you have separation from the planes on the parallel runway. What’s missing is careful monitoring and separation, and that’s what Lufthansa wanted.
You're leaving out that they had a filed flight plan which for an international flight means controllers had many hours of notice as to when the flight was scheduled to arrive and that they would be looking for an ILS approach and it was the responsibility of approach controllers to have a spot in the pattern for them.
They arrived in the area on time, and controllers had not allocated it a spot, which is why the pilot sounds a bit peeved when told there isn't a spot. When he asks for one and they tell him that they can't give an estimate, that's the second strike.
Strike three was telling him to fuck off ("what's your alternate, sir?")
Controllers pulled a power play to bully him for wanting an ILS approach that reduces airport traffic capacity (larger separation distances) and in the process created a risk compounding another risk (a fatigued long-distance flight crew.) This is how crashes happen. All because the airport and airlines want to shove more flights through the airport to make more money.
The sad thing is that they'll get away with it because we have a massive shortage of controllers right now (because they're underpaid and overworked. Thanks, Reagan.)
The flight plan factors into flow timing, which is used to manage capacity, but there's no reservation of a landing time. Flight plan timings aren't accurate enough for that to be feasible when you have landings at close to one a minute.
The flow timing rate used for approaches to SFO during visual conditions is based on visual approaches, so this particular aircraft didn't fall into the expectations used for that planning mechanism. Even then it's not a forward looking plan, just a rate limit on arrivals that causes departure clearances to be delayed. I'm not even sure if it works for international flights.
Are controllers expected to manage the details of the take off and landing queues and also expected to be be looking quite a bit upstream to see what's coming up and check the details of the flight and company policies?
I suspect the controller assumed this flight would use visual separation, like everyone else, when it entered the landing queue; and the pilot expected to use ILS, like everywhere else given the conditions, when it entered the landing queue. The difference in expectations became apparent only when clearance was given, at which point there's not enough flexibility to accommodate an ILS landing, and it's hard to guess when there will be a place to slot it in. Diverting to Oakland and repositioning later is a reasonable, if not optimal outcome.
My guess is, if either side had mentioned their expectations when the flight entered approach control, and it had been cleared up then, it would have been quite possible to get an ILS landing on the first go round. (ATIS recordings did say simultaneous visual approaches)
Now granted there is usually a second planner controller that does not talk to traffic but is responsible for looking ahead, perhaps that was affected by the shortage
I think the real issue is they promised 10 minutes max then once 15 minutes elapsed and the pilot complained, tower told the pilot to GTFO. It just feels wrong.
I keep seeing this repeated, but it's obviously not true. ATC does not work on any such basis.
ATC's job is to safely and efficiently route the traffic. Different traffic may have different needs, and if unexpected needs arise, ATC has broad discretion on whether or how to accommodate them. But being the first in line, or anywhere else in line, doesn't mean much if you're holding up other traffic - as demonstrated in this incident!
they were ready. "fly heading XXX, vectors for visual 28R", is them saying, "i'm ready for you to land". What norcal (not SFO) was not prepared to do was accommodate the extra wide gap that lufthansa's company policy would've required.
it was up to lufthansa to tell approach that they're not going to be able to accept the approach in use. It's being advertised on the atis that they would've been able to pick up in the air long before they got near the airport. (well, 10+ minutes before this interaction started anyway, they can probably get d-atis anywhere).
i'm sure it was said in the follow up video, but lufthansa knew what they were offering at SFO and if they needed something different they should've spoken up much sooner.
> i'm sure it was said in the follow up video, but lufthansa knew what they were offering at SFO and if they needed something different they should've spoken up much sooner.
How are they supposed to know that an ILS approach - a completely routine procedure - is not available? If the problem is them not giving ATC enough warning, what process is there for telling ATC ahead of time? What was SFO going to do if it clouded over, close the airport?
All of that information is published ahead of time by KSFO (and every other major airport) including runways in use, traffic patterns, minimum separations, available approach types, and how things will change in bad weather. Everything is available to the pilots and dispatchers ahead of time and in updates during the flight.
> What was SFO going to do if it clouded over, close the airport?
No, land planes at a slower rate (about half) because they can no longer land two planes side by side on the parallel runways. On a day when the weather is known to be cloudy and that is factored in up front, that's not a huge problem.
On a day when the weather is clear and planes are landing at the higher rate, it is a huge problem.
> On a day when the weather is known to be cloudy and that is factored in up front, that's not a huge problem.
> On a day when the weather is clear and planes are landing at the higher rate, it is a huge problem.
But it can get cloudy any time in SF. So suddenly needing to switch over to ILS operations should be something they're set up to handle pretty routinely.
They would normally have warning from weather forecasters about upcoming cloudy weather so they would have time to switch over to ILS operations in an orderly manner. Switching in the middle of a clear evening because of one plane is something quite different.
again, the ILS wasn't unavailable, but ATC for hundreds of miles had been planning on every plane taking the visual, with its reduced separation requirements. if a plane needs an approach with increased requirements, they need to tell ATC early so ATC can put them in their plan.
> How are they supposed to know that an ILS approach - a completely routine procedure - is not available?
it's not that the ILS wasn't available, it's that the atis would've said
"VISUAL APPROACH, RUNWAY 28L 28R IN USE"
and the lufthansa crew would say, "huh, we need something different than that". in aviation if you want something non standard, you need to let air traffic know so they can put you in their plan. If you don't tell them different, they're going to plan for you to do what's being advertised.
> What was SFO going to do if it clouded over, close the airport?
then SFO would've advertised the ILS (checks atis) like they're doing right now ...
> and the lufthansa crew would say, "huh, we need something different than that". in aviation if you want something non standard, you need to let air traffic know so they can put you in their plan. If you don't tell them different, they're going to plan for you to do what's being advertised.
So they should have, what, called them when they were back over the east coast? Genuine question. They filed the flight plan, they requested the approach they needed when they got there (which again, is a completely routine one that SFO uses every week), it sounds like they were sending all the communication that's expected?
the flight plan doesn't have any bearing here. norcal approach isn't (and shouldn't be) expected to know the SOP's for every company in the world. the flight's clearance limit was to SFO and they were being given the approach that their requested airport was advertising.
> called them when they were back over the east coast?
depends on who they were on with when they found out SFO was advertising an approach they couldn't take. At the very least they could've told oakland center; that's who they would've been talking to before being transferred to norcal approach, and is probably the one sequencing a good chunk of those other planes coming in.
You misunderstand the problem. APP did not say they they don't have ILS available, it said it will take some time before a long enough gap exists between incoming traffic so they can allow for LH to insert themselves for landing.
In aviation, times are almost always estimates, not hard figures. Just like when the captain announces every 15 minutes there will be 15 minutes more delay, the same happens when controllers have other things to do, they route you over a holding pattern until they can deal with you.
And seriously, you don't delay 20-30 flights because one non emergency flight can't do visual approaches at night.
I wonder if there is any mechanism that reconfirms landing slots (and other aspects of the flight plan) still being available after a delayed takeoff for cases like this.
Is it really just a matter of taking off and hoping for the best, or did somebody in the chain of granting a take-off clearance miss something?
I've had flights that were delayed, and then during the start of the boarding process, we had to stop and switch to a different aircraft, because the delay meant we'd be too loud for the noise curfew when we arrived, so we needed to take a quieter plane. That was a domestic flight into a small airport (LGB), but I imagine there's something to manage total flight volume in general; there's certainly exception handling to delay or cancel departures when the destination airport is unlikely to be available due to weather.
That’s a static rule that the pilots can (and have to) comply with based on information available to them, though.
I wonder if an updated (international) flight plan is checked for projected congestion levels (based on other flight plans?) at all and can be declined for that reason?
The flightplans get shared and updated with every involved area. Usually those can say no ahead of time and always at the time of airspace entry (entering US airspace for example)
What checks the FAA does to those plans, I doubt we'll ever know
The original "Thanks Regan" comment makes no sense to me.
To be clear, President Regan fired all striking air traffic controllers in 1981. The same Wiki article says: <<The FAA had initially claimed that staffing levels would be restored within two years; however, it took closer to 10 years before the overall staffing levels returned to normal.>>
So that means, FAA had enough controllers by 1991. What does that incident have to do with today's shortage? Nothing.
Deeper: I tried to Google why is there a shortage of air traffic controllers in the United States. The root cause appears unclear to me. I found this article[1], that says: <<Secretary Buttigieg did have some promising news right after Labor Day, when he announced that 1,500 air traffic controllers had been hired this year after an aggressive recruiting campaign and a raise in starting salary to $127,000 a year.>>
That is a huge salary in the United States. I'm surprised this is not attracting more qualified candidates. This tells me that this requirements to become an FAA-certified air traffic controller are incredibly strict. Does anyone know why EU / Japan / Korea does not have the same issues? (All highly-advanced, wealthy nations with lots of air travel.)
“I gave them a choice. Continue this and I will by every means at my disposal teach you and get the people of Singapore to help me teach you a lesson you won't forget.
Took them 65 minutes and they decided ok it isn't worth the fight.
Why? Because they know they'll lose.
They know that I'm prepared to ground the airline. They know that I can get the airline going again without them.“
I'm confused here. Were the Singapore Airlines pilots unionized? If yes, was it illegal for them to strike? These types of "strong man" posts do so little for me. Zero useful context provided and lacking in any nuance.
For example, some light Googling tells me:
Mr Lee had in 1980 taken the pilots' union to task for staging an unofficial work-to-rule protest in November, to demand a 30 per cent basic pay...
To me, "work-to-rule protest" isn't illegal. Annoying, yes, but legal in most places. 30% increase in basic pay: Maybe their current pay was far too low? Again: No deeper info provided in your post.
Singapore is not a representative example of... anything, honestly. Certainly not of "EU / Japan / Korea" which was the original question. So I have no idea what you're getting at.
"On 20 July 2023, the Korean Metal Workers' Union (KMWU) took another strong stand against trade union repression in Korea, calling for an end to the heavy-handed tactics employed by the government."
The idea that workers in unions in Asia suddenly have robust worker protections is false.
The very fact that these fights are happening in 2023 demonstrates that there are, or at least were until recently, strong and active unions. Maybe the Korean government's 2009 law really did depower the unions, and maybe Korea will see a corresponding shortage of workers in air traffic control and similar safety-critical jobs gradually develop as the effect of that works its way through.
Most US airports are not located inside large cities. They are located 15-30km outside large cities. Normally, there is plenty of much cheaper suburban housing available.
Also, in your view, is 127k as a starting salary not enough for a "life and death responsibility job"? If no, are you willing to pay higher airfares to cover the cost? If yes, by how much in %?
I love these types of reactionary, emotional HN posts. This term: "life and death responsibility job": Do bus/train/truct drivers, crane operators, ER nurses/doctors, firefighters, police, military group troops qualify for that same phrase? I am sure all except medical doctors have a starting salary much, much lower than 127k.
Why are we thanking Reagan (sarcastically)? The mandatory retirement age for air traffic controllers is 56 and he fired them all 42 years ago. Presumably none of them were prepubescent, so they wouldn't be working today.
it's not about arriving "on time", it's about telling approach what they needed early so approach can fit the request into their plan. and, at least according to the initial video, they didn't until they were being given vectors for the approach.
A small nitpick: the other aircraft were doing _visual_ approaches, not VFR approaches. A visual approach is a type of instrument approach operated under IFR regulations. Practically, this has no affect on your comment. Just pointing this out in case its interesting to you or others (if you didn't know this already).
Does this mean controllers still have a responsibility of separating aircraft under a visual approach? (A comment in a sibling thread mentioned that Lufthansa pilots are allowed visual approaches, but are not allowed to be responsible for visual separation at night.)
Edit: sounds like visual approach means ATC do not have responsibility for separation. I thought the entire point of IFR (which – according to you – visual approach falls under) was that ATC is responsible for separation!
From what I understand, despite the tower not being able to create a gap for 30+ minutes,which although extreme may be understandable due to SFO being the way it is, another major factor was the fact that the tower was unable to provide a realistic estimated time to enter the circuit. That is completely unacceptable.
As for not being able to give an accurate estimate, that is not for the on-the-radio approach controller to calculate, given their view of the airspace. The video posted by parent shows how long the inbound flows were (at least on the east side); approach wouldn’t have seen that.
I meant for the ATC to provide a descent estimate of when Lufthansa should be expected to enter the AERODROME TRAFFIC CIRCUIT (since you want tolink the FAA glossary) in order to land (they had them on a hold pattern for 35+ minutes). This is independent of whether the approach is IFR or VFR. A TOWER controller has all the information necessary to calculate that estimate, and should be expected to do so, the same way a stock trader is expected to calculate PnL of their positions on the fly given the current stock price.
Most of the queue would have been with approach, not tower. The aircraft sequenced to land were split across at least two controllers, tower and approach, and possibly more than one approach controller depending on how SFO splits them up. I would expect approach to be able to provide a reasonable estimate but it seems like in this case the estimate was found to be four minutes off, which seems totally within the bounds of a reasonable estimate from an approach controller.
The traffic pattern (US term) isn't really a factor here either way, airliners flying visual still usually use charted routes (like the instrument procedures) or radar vectors rather than the pattern. Remember that the pattern is only about one mile out from the field. By the time airliners are that close they're probably cleared.
> but it seems like in this case the estimate was found to be four minutes off
No, I don't think you are being at all accurate about characterizing that; maybe you lost count of the delays. After being told to wait ten more minutes, the pilots waited an extra four minutes before pressing for an update, and got told to wait another 10-15 (or f off).
Aerodrome traffic circuit is the ICAO term for traffic pattern, which is it what it is called in the US (it may be in the glossary but the point is that manual uses "traffic pattern" repeatedly). And this "traffic circuit" you refer to is almost always a VFR thing, as IFR approaches use specific charted procedures that generally do not end with a traffic circuit.
Aerodrome traffic pattern is completely different from holding patterns. And this is what LH was instructed to do, keep holding. Holding patterns are published for all airports and usually planes are stacked on those holding patterns and they are emptied FIFO style. Busier airports have multiple holding patterns to accommodate a large number of aircraft in case of on ground emergencies.
Sure, but GP stated wrt traffic patterns, "This is independent of whether the approach is IFR or VFR." which is not the case. For IFR, as was the case here, the LH was looking to execute an IFR approach, not ever enter the aerodrome traffic circuit.
That's why it is called an estimate. It is how much you think it might take, not the exact amount of time.
When asked about how long something it is going to take, everyone is given an estimate, not an absolute value. And this is because a lot of things can happen in between that are out of everyone's control.
I found that part delightfully ironic, because it's basically a meme that whenever a flight is delayed ground staff/pilots will always tell passengers "we'll just be off in just a few minutes" over and over again regardless of how long the delay is going to be.
The controller tried to give an estimated time, but that original estimate was blown out of the water by the other planes in the queue taking longer than expected, and the controller didn't have time to keep trying to give an updated estimated time to the one plane in the queue that wanted to do things the hard way (that also, due to circumstances within its own control, departed its original airport late and arrived outside of the window where SFO could have accommodated its silly request without any delays).
Your framing here is weird and doesn't match the facts. The airplane didn't want to do anything. Its pilots were following a mandatory company safety policy.
My framing here is literally based on the transcript of the conversation between the pilot and ATC.
Its pilots were following a mandatory company safety policy.
This is not true, because if it was true the pilot would already have diverted to Oakland per "mandatory" company "safety" policy when he was first told that they would not be able to accommodate his non-standard request to disrupt the twenty plus planes that were already in the queue.
It's not the ATC's fault the pilot didn't manage his plane's schedule properly.
> first told that they would not be able to accommodate his non-standard request
Now you are just making things up. Please go take a chill pill and stop spreading misinformation.
Edit: You may not be aware of the international differences in views on visual approaches. Requesting ILS is far from the "silly request" you seem to be trying to mock. This doesn't mean that ATC was wrong to make the decisions that they did, but it does mean it is a reasonable safety request to make. https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/47638/why-are-v...
The key bit of information missing here and from all these replies is that Lufthansa’s no SFO night time VFR policy was a reaction to and SFO and NorCal notice requiring this limitation from inbound international carriers after a few incidents but the requirement of how to implement this was ambiguous and Lufthansa is complying as best they can
>It's not clear who's in the wrong here; just an unintended consequence from many well-intentioned decisions.
Attention should be given not just to what was said, but how it was said. It is obvious the controller was frustrated. It conveys the impression that at least part of his decision-making was influenced by spite and not good intentions.
I don’t think this makes much sense in the real world. Shit happens and plans change. What if an aircraft needs to do a go-around, do they suddenly face 45m of delay or immediately need to divert, because The Sequence is immutable?
No, they’d move things around a bit. SFO decided that this plane wasn’t going to land there as soon as they asked for ILS, instead of doing their job and making a gap.
> What if an aircraft needs to do a go-around, do they suddenly face 45m of delay or immediately need to divert, because The Sequence is immutable?
You would be surprised, but if it is a busy time, they will not be put in the sequence right away and will be put at the back of the line, which will take as long as it is going to take.
If you do a go around, you will be passed to APP which will decide what to do with you.
I listened to the first YT video from VASAviation and then the followup video that is very long with a lot of explanations.
I think Lufthansa was in the wrong here:
- they knew SFO does visual parallel landings, and ILS is provided if able and it does not interrupt the flow of planes
- pilots attitude was not very professional and they started on the wrong foot with "you told us 10 minutes that ended 4 minutes ago"
- then they told ATC they're gonna fuck up their sequence
- then they started complaining again that why is everyone sequenced before them even though ATC told them that they will be cleared once there's a hole in the arrivals sequence long enough to accommodate an ILS landing, and the new estimate was 15-20min more
It is a requirement for pilots to know how an airport operates and what to expect when they get there or depart.
I guess in the end Lufthansa needs to send pilots with better manners to SFO and put more fuel in their airplanes in case they need to wait for a gap in the arrival sequence to accommodate ILS.
I don't understand why what seems like such obvious common-sense about this flight is so controversial. Is it the lack of deference ATC gave the pilots, treating them like equals instead of superiors?
A bit of an aside, but: I live and drive along 101 south of SFO, and you can literally see this chain of landings- typically if I can see the plane flying between San Mateo Bridge and SFO, I can see the next pair of planes, and at night/clear weather, I can see one or two more pairs.
I went to check flightradar but I can see right now they are landing planes in the opposite configuration (approaching from the northeast instead of the south east), I guess because of wind conditions (see Operational Flow, https://www.flysfo.com/about/community-noise/noise-office/fl...).
Another important detail: they did this because it was company policy, not because it's what the pilots wanted. The pilots would have been more than happy to do a visual approach.
IMHO the blame lies with the Lufthansa corporate office.
I agree that Lufthansa has to accept the repercussions of their policy, and if somebody asks me for a favor and says they need to because "it's their policy", I'd squint pretty hard at them, that's not really the jurisdiction of policy.
For all the people who believe that the policy is the safest and safety comes first, that's a fine opinion, but if other people don't agree to that tradeoff (absolute safety versus demands on a crowded airport timeslot) you have to accept that, you can't impose your opinion about safety on everybody else's schedule.
I can also see that the air traffic controller might have messed up. Perhaps they intended to squeeze Lufthansa in when they told them to wait, and maybe they forgot and didn't, and then when pressed they got irritated, that's how overworked people typically would react; but still it was their call.
Perhaps this flight is never late so they never encountered this situation before. We can't expect everything to go smoothly all the time, so we don't necessarily need policy changes because of what happened, simply adjust what expectations we should have. And if Lufthansa expects future conflicts, now is the time to work it out with the appropriate parties (i.e. not the whole internet)
1/ Visual vs instrument approach. The main difference in this case is separation requirements that ATC must provide. Specifically, under IFR rules ATC mus provide 3 miles / 500 feet altitude separation minimum. For visual approaches, the separation is responsibility of the pilots and this enables parallel runway landings at SFO with much shorter intervals (there is a version of parallel landings with instrument approaches at SFO but it discontinued during Covid and not resumed since AFAIK).
2/ The approach sequence is established long long long before arrival to the airport. The ATC controllers (approach and center) coordinate arrivals and create sequencing hundreds of miles from a large airport like SFO. The last minute Lufthansa request for an instrument approach would have forced dozens of planes to go into hold or fly vectors which creates a lot of work for everyone.
3/ SFO tower is NOT responsible for approaches and was not dealing with holding Lufthansa. This is responsibility of NorCal approach
4/ My personal take is that Lufthansa should have advised ATC that they need instrument approach much earlier (as soon as they got ATIS which would be 50-100 miles from airport). That would have enabled ATC to create a gap for them. Last minute request is a surprise nobody needs. The Lufthansa attitude afterwards is unacceptable. They were asking for preferential treatment (get us in and screw a couple dozen of other airplanes). They also should have communicated to ATC that they have 30 mins of fuel for hold and that would informed NorCal about time limits they are working with. Lastly, threatening ATC with a fuel emergency.... not nice, not nice at all. From my personal experience with ATC is that they are very accommodating but they don't like surprises. Tell them what you want early and controllers usually find ways to make it work by the time you get there. Have a last minute request? If ATC is not busy they will help you. If ATC is busy -- go to the back of the line. Which is exactly what happened here.
Yes. I got the feeling that the pilot was playing the cry-wolf game with the threat of declaring fuel emergency. ATC then responded with, ok, divert. It’s a case of FAFO.
I can definitely see it both ways. When I imagine myself as a pilot who has been on spacing/holding vectors for 30+ minutes with repeated delays and no sign of even trying to slot me in, I may very well also have fallen for the temptation of informing ATC of the upcoming fuel issue in a sarcastic way. Still unprofessional, of course, but in a different context the exact same words could be taken as a lighthearted reminder rather than a threat. (And for all my stereotypes about Germans, it may very well have been a failed attempt at humour in a strained situation.)
But yeah, from that point on ATC did seem very professional to me.
The article and the video embedded within leave out a lot of context.
The Norcal controller was extremely unprofessional. Their behavior is a great example of the US controller attitude™ US ATC is so infamous for. No idea why this unprofessionalism is so prevalent in the US; I can only presume it has to do with being overworked and understaffed, with perhaps a pinch of god complex.
This was handled by Norcal, but SFO has an infamous controller whose poor behavior can be found all over the internet and the nearby smaller SQL controller who thought he was enough of a hot shit that he could lecture a designated examiner after the latter stepped in when the controller was acting like an unprofessional asshole on the radio.
A lot of this asshole behavior is targeted at international pilots, but enough of it is targeted at US pilots that I know of pilots who throw retirement parties for certain asshole controllers without inviting the retiree.
Anyways, let's focus on this particular incident.
For starters, SFO is a huge mess in every sense of the word. The design of the airport is just plain stupid, primarily the distance between the parallel runways that cause severe limitations when the weather isn't perfect.
Then there's the matter that SFO is just not suitable for the amount of traffic it gets, coupled with overworked controllers who rather kick the responsibility over to the pilots, leading to the visual approach and visual seperation preference by SFO.
Secondly, the notion that this is something new and novel that SFO has never heard of and can't do, or as the article puts it: "when all other planes are landing just fine", is just BS.
This flight from Munich comes in every night at SFO with the same IMC flight plan and the same path, so SFO/Norcal should be familiar with this, especially since it's their home base and Lufthansa is a regular customer.
Not only that, but many European airlines have the same regulations on visual separation at night as do other international airlines. The reason this is SOP with so many airlines is for a couple of reasons.
1) You cannot maintain visual separation at night based on lights only, there is no depth perception, and by the time you realize something's fucked, you're too late. TCAS isn't accurate enough for aircraft separation and explicitly states this in the manual.
2) The incident history in the US related to taking visuals at night supports the idea that this should not be allowed. The FDX170 incident in Tulsa comes to mind, or the ACA759 incident that nearly clipped a tail at SFO, no less.
3) The FAA advised against letting international airlines take visuals at night.
4) METAR had SCT and BKN cloud below 1500ft
On top of all that, PAL104 had received ILS just moments before without even asking for it (because it was in their flight plan).
So there's no need to act like this is some kind of extremely weird thing that blindsighted Norcal/SFO.
Thirdly, ultimately, the captain makes the determination of what they need, and the controller is supposed to provide that to the best of their ability.
Had the controller taken the flight plan into account and had their experience with Lufthansa's daily flights, then none of this would've happened, and nobody would've had to be delayed.
Nevertheless, the controller could've still granted ILS without much issue, it would've caused about 5 minutes of delay for the next flight.
That said, it's also not unreasonable to delay Lufthansa if the controller doesn't want to go through that effort.
That's the only reasonable thing the controller did.
What isn't reasonable is to hold Lufthansa for 30 minutes without any information or contact, then tack on another 10 minutes two more times.
And what especially isn't reasonable is to force them to divert to Oakland and say things like "this conversation is over" because your ego is bruised.
The Norcal controller was way out of line and with what passes for SOP in the US we're gonna have our own Tenerife disaster soon enough.
VASAviation released a very long video afterwards with the whole conversation (LH talking to NorCal APP) and the written document from a controller explaining why LH was put on a holding pattern.
> What isn't reasonable is to hold Lufthansa for 30 minutes without any information or contact, then tack on another 10 minutes two more times.
Maybe because they had no available slots so nothing new to share with LH?
> And what especially isn't reasonable is to force them to divert to Oakland and say things like "this conversation is over" because your ego is bruised.
Well, LH threatened the controller with declaring a fuel emergency that would fuck up their sequence. I think the controller responded in kind.
> The NorCal controller was way out of line and with what passes for SOP in the US we're gonna have our own Tenerife disaster soon enough.
Somehow I don't think controllers care very much for company policies that they see as impeding their operations. It's not the first controller to do this to a plane if the captain objects to the instructions received from ATC in a busy airspace.
Speaking of:
> On top of all that, PAL104 had received ILS just moments before without even asking for it (because it was in their flight plan).
Do you have PAL104 FP from that night? Because the longer video from VASAviation shows that PAL104 got an ILS clearance because there was a gap in traffic long enough to accommodate them.
> The Norcal controller was extremely unprofessional. Their behavior is a great example of the US controller attitude™ US ATC is so infamous for.
I have no idea where you're getting this from. I've personally flown hundreds of hours in Norcal, and I find the ATC controllers there to be some of the most competent and excellent professionals I've ever interacted with in my entire life. The vast majority of pilots I know feel the same way.
> 1) You cannot maintain visual separation at night based on lights only
There are multiple position lights on an aircraft, and you can perceive depth from their apparent angular distances. I've flown visual approaches at night myself, and thousands upon thousands of airplanes do this safely every night across the US.
> say things like "this conversation is over" because your ego is bruised.
Maybe it had more to do with attending to the dozens of other jets the controller was actively responsible for at the time? Do you understand how busy these frequencies can get?
> Nevertheless, the controller could've still granted ILS without much issue, it would've caused about 5 minutes of delay for the next flight.
I guess you didn't read the big response on the YT channel? They categorically refuted this idea.
> 2) The incident history in the US related to taking visuals at night supports the idea that this should not be allowed.
No, it really doesn't. Both incidents you cite were caused by fatigue, and may well have been no different during the day. There have probably been literal millions of safe nighttime visual approaches in the last decade in the US.
Maybe you've heard bad things about circling approaches at night? That those are unsafe is a much more widely held opinion among pilots, some US airlines don't allow them. But that's very different.
> 3) The FAA advised against letting international airlines take visuals at night.
The government isn't a monolithic entity, and neither is the FAA. Assuming ATC must allow the ILS because the FAA put out this PR statement is as silly as assuming the USPS must know what address to use when the IRS demands a document from you.
> 4) METAR had SCT and BKN cloud below 1500ft
Doesn't matter if the approach was clear.
> The Norcal controller was way out of line and with what passes for SOP in the US we're gonna have our own Tenerife disaster soon enough.
Maybe the reason why Lufthansa does not allow visual approach at SFO at night, could be after the Air Canada near miss.
> The NTSB determined the probable cause was the Air Canada flight crew's confusion of the runway with the parallel taxiway, with contributing causes including the crew's failure to use the instrument landing system (ILS), as well as pilot fatigue.
FAA changed the rules for SFO and made visual approaches forbidden at night "when an adjacent parallel runway is closed" [2]. Maybe Lufthansa plays it safe and requires ILS for all long haul night landings.
Asiana 214 crashed (in broad daylight and perfect visibility) because Asiana pilots were overused to landing on the autopilot, which was off on this landing; also because they ignored the "sink rate" warning going off for a minute.
Not because landing at SFO is particularly dangerous.
Pilots are not going to be accustomized of visual landings in case of emergency, if you have a corporate policy that forbids them in controlled setting!
This one is bizzare, not only European pilots on average have less experience than US ones, but they are not allowed to gain experience by corporate policy.
(This one coming from a country where aviation is a big mess)
>> Pilots are not going to be accustomized of visual landings in case of emergency
> Visual landings are only disallowed at night
I don't agree with the rest of what he said... but he actually has a valid point here. Emergencies happen at night too, and sometimes the nature of the emergency will make an instrument approach impossible.
The visual approach isn't an issue, it's the requirements to maintain visual separation. Under emergency conditions, you'd expect the separation to be handled by ATC.
> Under emergency conditions, you'd expect the separation to be handled by ATC.
ATC is never responsible for general traffic separation in visual meteorological conditions in the United States.
ATC is responsible for separating IFR airplanes from other IFR airplanes. When flying below 18000ft MSL in VMC, those IFR aircraft are still responsible for looking out the window to see and avoid VFR aircraft who may not be talking to ATC (and to be clear, the VFR aircraft is jointly responsible).
Just to drive this home: it is still 100% legal to fly around in a Piper Cub at 9500ft MSL with no transponder or radio in most of the country. It is legal to fly around VFR in a jet at 17500ft squawking 1200 not talking to ATC almost everywhere in the country. Primary radar coverage is going away, not getting better. You have to look out the window.
Russia - a history of crashes caused by rapid growth and weird aircraft park, followed by the war where the whole industry is now out of international law.
It can absolutely make sense to "train" with passengers on board.
Automation complacency or simply being out of practice can have significant repercussions in emergencies.
Consider a task where humans have a marginally higher error rate than the autopilot. Obviously, per task, the safe thing to do is to let the autopilot fly.
But now consider a more difficult scenario where the autopilot just bails out, e.g. due to ILS being inoperable, wind shear, any kind of non-permissible sensor discrepancy on board etc. – how would you like be on a plane flown by a pilot that has never done a manual landing in the past few months or even years due to company policy?
Of course, a night approach at a foreign airport might not be the best opportunity to practice a manual landing (and it looks like the planned arrival time was during daylight hours!), but as a general policy, allowing some manual flying seems like a very good safety practice, at least until autopilots can fly and land in 100% of all scenarios.
For me, a training flight is a flight that is written with appropriate "exercise" number into logbook and is part of the official training program. These days most airlines do those on simulators, and they will include "rarer" operations like rarely used approaches (2xNDB instead of ILS, how to fly DME arc approach, etc), instrument failures, and so on.
You do not do such flights with passengers, because you're intentionally lowering the safety level.
In addition to that, there's a recommendation to randomly, given safe conditions, do regular manual operations. Mind you, those SOPs probably explicitly say "do not experiment after long haul flight".
I might have been a bit more cross because people have died (including in ways that impacted me) because of organizations that mixed "training" and "passenger" flights.
A pilot's 'flight hours' is regarded as a key measure of their experience.
If a pilot only ever trained visual approaches in sim, and not the real world accounting for the overwhelming majority of their flight experience, that number would be meaningless.
"Experience building" by flight hours (and in properly managed organizations, regular "manual" flying) is not the same as "training", at least in local vocabulary as used by my flight instructors and other people I know in aviation.
Thus somewhat mixed reading of what I wrote earlier. Was obvious to me, from responses wasn't obvious to others.
We don't test software systems in production either. Except we do.
We should be testing in non-production environments, but non-prod is not the same as production, so it is inevitable that you will be testing a system change when you deploy to prod. If your non-prod environment is similar enough that there are NO system changes when you deploy to prod ... then your non-prod env is actually prod, because that would mean that your non-prod network routing, auth, and database are the same as prod, because changing any one of those would be a system change.
> Pilot: If we are not set up for base soon, we will have to declare a fuel emergency and that would really fuck up your sequence.
> Controller: What is your divert field?
> Pilot: Oakland
> Controller: Ok you need vectors to Oakland?
> Pilot: No, my company forbids visual separation at night, what is the problem here?
> Controller: I can't have this conversation with you. You either divert to Oakland or you can continue to hold. It's up to you sir.
> Pilot: Ok you promised me 10 minutes, that ran out 4 minutes ago, so how many more minutes?
> Controller: This conversation is over.
So this controller, knowing the plane was near a fuel emergency, gave the pilots the option to either crash their plane with 240 people on board, or to divert to Oakland. This is tough for me to wrap my head around.
I don't want to blame this one controller for what is obviously a pattern of systematic failures at SFO, but I'm going to seriously consider flying into Oakland or San Jose next time if this is the attitude of the controllers there.
Pilot was bluffing. If they call an emergency, they can do whatever they want. But they can't just call a fuel emergency if they have enough fuel to divert to a viable alternate - that's not how the system is supposed to work. They're supposed to divert if they get close to minimum fuel and can't land at their primary airport.
Of course, if it's a real emergency they can call any emergency (weather at alternate preventing them from landing there for example), but not threaten a controller to call an emergency just to get priority handling at their primary.
The controller knew that and just called it. A diversion is a major annoyance but not a safety issue.
Communicating to a controller that they are close to a fuel emergency is not a threat, it is good practice. People have died because their pilots did not communicate their fuel situation sufficiently to their controllers [1].
This was communicated in this instance, and the controller maintained that to land at SFO, they would have to risk running out of fuel, since the controller refused to give a time-window for landing, or to declare an emergency.
If the pilot declared an emergency the ATC would make room for them, whatever the inconvenience to the airport and the other planes on approach. But after the fact there would be an investigation, and the pilot would be at fault if they falsely declared an emergency or deliberately caused an emergency by flying around in circles until they had to land just because they didn’t want to divert.
If the pilot’s being serious, he’ll declare an emergency and then the ATC will take him seriously. Otherwise he can continue to hold or he can divert to Oakland. There’s not much point in arguing about it over the radio, so I can see why the ATC ended the conversation.
American Airlines (at JFK) proved you can call emergency just because you feel like it with no repercussion.
And really the pilot in command is the one in control. For the attitude that controller had he should have declared an emergency and told him what he was going to do and have him clear all airplanes around them.
Bullying attitude don’t belong in a game with 500mph (~300mph in this case) objects. If you’re going to be a bully expect others to play the game in the same manner.
> American Airlines (at JFK) proved you can call emergency just because you feel like it with no repercussion.
I don't think it's that simple. In the AA case you refer to, the pilot was concerned about the high crosswind on the runway ATC wanted him to land on, so he declared an emergency so he could land on a safer runway. Crosswind landings are dicey at the best of times, and I suspect that if the AA pilot didn't get any repercussions it was because in that situation his action was considered a reasonable judgment call. Yes, technically it wasn't an "emergency" since nothing was wrong with the plane, but it was in the sense that the pilot did not think he could safely land on the runway ATC wanted him to land on, so it was a safety issue.
Following along that logic. Nobody would fault the LH pilot for a similar judgement call requiring an immediate landing at the closest suitable airport, namely SFO.
ATC was in the wrong here and the attitude displayed was neither called for nor professional.
> Nobody would fault the LH pilot for a similar judgement call
Bad analogy. The LH pilot's reason for asking for an ILS approach was company policy; he made no claim that he was unable to make a visual landing safely because of actual conditions, only that his company wouldn't allow him to make a visual landing as a matter of policy.
> ATC was in the wrong here and the attitude displayed was neither called for nor professional.
Many other posters in this discussion have pointed out aspects of the situation that make it clear that it wasn't that simple.
And this is (should be, at least) good practise. When there's an emergency, you don't want pilots second-guessing that radio call because they are worried about repercussions if they understood the situation wrong.
It's a safety issue when the plane is getting low on fuel and the crew are fatigued from a long international flight, and the only reason they're being told no is because of policies designed to maximize airport/airline profits.
Controllers had hours of notice the flight would need an ILS approach. They petulantly ignored it because ILS approaches take up more space in the pattern, which means less landings per hour, which means less profit for the airport operator.
In the EU visual separation at night is not permitted but it's routinely done in the US because airports and airlines can run more flights in and out of the airport due to closer separation distances and it also reduces controller labor.
Airlines are pushing the system to the breaking point.
Crew fatigue is not an ATC concern. Long haul flights like this carry relief pilots and have crew rest facilities so fatigue shouldn't be an issue in the first place.
Controllers mostly work for the FAA. They have volume goals to meet, but they aren't accountable to airport or airline management for profit targets.
Crew fatigue really isn't an ATC concern. The FAA and airlines set rules for crew fatigue management. Flight plans are designed to keep the crew within limits even if they have a delay or diversion. It is simply not a controller's job to assess a flight crew's fatigue state, or second guess whether they need an alternate plan due to fatigue. Controllers aren't trained or qualified to do that.
>They petulantly ignored it because ILS approaches take up more space in the pattern, which means less landings per hour, which means less profit for the airport operator.
Can you explain this? Do planes have choices over where to land once in the air? If not, all the landings needed to happen, so why does delaying some by a few minutes affect the total income for the airport on that evening?
I'm just questioning how an airport's overall profit motive would affect an indiviual air traffic controller's decision making like that.
The total number of landings is not fixed. If landings can be more frequent, airlines will schedule more landings so they are more frequent. Just like adding lanes to a highway induces more cars to travel on the highway.
I'm talking about the the situation on a given day when the planes are already in the air. All those scheduled flights are presumably going to end up landing at that airport and paying the agreed fee, no?
>Controllers had hours of notice the flight would need an ILS approach. They petulantly ignored it because ILS approaches take up more space in the pattern, which means less landings per hour, which means less profit for the airport operator.
That would also mean it's really incredibly difficult to declare a fuel emergency around SFO, since Oakland and San Jose and (I guess, if it were really urgent) Moffat Field are all a five minute flight away, right?
The distance to the alternate really doesn’t matter much, because you always load enough additional fuel to divert to your alternate and land, plus more fuel called the “final reserve” which is enough to fly for another 30 or 45 minutes (depending on the airline and region). That amount of fuel is called the “minimum fuel”. If you get down to your minimum fuel and you aren’t actually landing at your destination yet, then you radio the controllers and tell them that you’re at minimum fuel and are diverting to your alternate. It is only time to declare an emergency if you get down to your final reserve, by which time you should already be at your alternate airport.
Also, you can’t really use the straight–line distance between airports to figure out how much extra fuel to bring, because you never end up flying that line. For one thing, you have to approach the airport from the correct direction so that you line up with a runway and so that you’re headed into the wind. For another, you have to get down from the altitude you were holding at to ground level. Between the two you need to go not towards the airport, but towards a spot far enough away from the airport that you can fly a gentle slope down towards the runway. You might even end up flying completely around the airport while descending before actually turning in and lining up with the approach runway.
You can't do it that quickly. You have to look at the charts, set up the airplane, brief the other pilot(s) about the approach and landing, etc.
You can have mayday fuel situations where attempting to divert is more risky. But in this case they had plenty of time to prepare to divert to Oakland.
> So this controller, knowing the plane was near a fuel emergency, gave the pilots the option to either crash their plane with 240 people on board, or to divert to Oakland. This is tough for me to wrap my head around.
They weren't even close to a fuel emergency (about to become unable land with less than the 45 minute reserve fuel amount), considering they didn't even declare minimum fuel, which is the stage before emergency (enough to fly to your alternate and land there without going below reserve).
IMO the only mistake by the controller was giving them a 10 minute delay (which I didn't hear in the video, maybe it was skipped?) instead of telling them about an indefinite delay (which was in the video) without having a plan to actually slot them in. Bay Area airspace is incredibly crowded and you have traffic pipelined in all over the place, so it's pretty difficult for the controllers to increase separation for one flight without causing a cascading traffic jam.
> I don't want to blame this one controller for what is obviously a pattern of systematic failures at SFO, but I'm going to seriously consider flying into Oakland or San Jose next time if this is the attitude of the controllers there.
Considering NorCal Approach controls the sequencing for SFO, SJC, and OAK, I don't think that's going to do what you think it does.
Those aren’t the options presented, you’re being dramatic. The pilot has the options to wait or divert, no matter what the controller says, in any situation where they cannot get into an airport.
There is no risk of crashing here. The pilot cannot call the controllers bluff and declare a fuel emergency to land at SFO because Oakland is so close and it would be unprofessional.
The controller doesn’t have time to explain why the previous estimate was wrong or discuss company policy.
> The controller doesn’t have time to explain why the previous estimate was wrong or discuss company policy.
Absolutely. ATC might have been less helpful than possible here, maybe because they had too much on their plate. In that case, if they waste further time on long discussions and get behind on their other planes, the whole carefully juggled sequence might break down, sending many planes to holding or even their alternate.
Declaring a fuel emergency doesn’t mean that they have run out of fuel, or that they will run out of fuel soon. It means that if even they diverted to their alternate right now, they would expect to go below their reserve fuel level before they could land. The reserve fuel level is there to give them an extra half hour or more of flight time. Absent some mechanical problem with the engines, or a fuel leak, declaring a fuel emergency would mean that the pilots waited too long at their destination airport before thinking about diverting. You’re supposed to simply divert _before_ you would need to declare an emergency, rather than declare an emergency simply in order to skip ahead in line.
There was no risk of a crash in this circumstance, because the plane still had plenty of fuel to divert to their alternate and land before going into their final reserve.
It's pretty easy to explain: the controller took the pilot at his word, and immediately offered the fastest and safest option to get them on the ground, which was to land at Oakland. The runway thresholds at SFO and OAK are less than ten miles apart.
No ILS is not an ATC rule, it's simply a way to get more flights to land (increasing airline/airport profits) and putting responsibility on the pilot (not ATC). Lufthansa has the policy exactly so that pilots do not get bullied into taking a visual approach, by ATC.
Most pilots would prefer a visual approach given the choice. I doubt this pilot actually believed it would be unsafe to fly the visual at SFO that evening: given the dozens of other jets actively doing it, that would be absurd. He was just following his company policy. If he had a real emergency that required him to land immediately, I'm almost certain he'd have flown that emergency landing visually.
I don't know for sure... but on a modern jet, I suspect he was able to contact his employer during that long hold to ask, and they told him "yes, we really want you to divert if you can't get the ILS". Either way, if there's any fault here, IMHO it's on his employer not doing their homework and putting their pilot in a no-win situation.
I wouldn't put it like that. I think the pilot probably genuinely believed that diverting him would be much more of a problem for ATC than working him in, and was trying to make sure the controller understood he was going to need to divert soon.
If there was a fuel emergency the pilot would have declared a fuel emergency. This was more him getting pissy for having to wait. Big jets normally have enough extra fuel to circle for hours without a problem.
Depends on some factors, but required and also common is 30/45 minutes, +10% longer flights, before diversion (that fuel not included).
Recently experienced a closed airport, needed to divert, and even with chances high that we need to circle again for a while, we only took 1 hour fuel for circling before 2nd divert (and luckily made it after 40 minutes). It was no big jet, but some bigger especially cannot even land with too much fuel.
Fwiw fuel emergency is nowhere near crashing the plane.
A full blow “mayday fuel” may be declared because at that point the usable fuel on landing will be less than final reserve. Final reserve is 30mn of holding flight.
Either the plane has a fuel emergency, or it doesnt. If they had a fuel emergency, the pilot wouldnt have threatened to call one, they would have just done it.
Instead, by threatening to issue an emergency, the pilot reveled his cards - he was annoyed at the delay. The controller called the bluff and told him to fuck off and wait at the back of line or land in Oakland.
In the future, Lufthansa cam call ATC before hand if they want special treatment.
I guess the controller shouldn’t make recommendations but give choices. If the controller is saying “you must divert” they are give advice based on a very short conversation. Whereas the pilot has all the information.
HN understands this concept well. Look at any advice asking thread. People don’t tell the asker what to do.
> So this controller, knowing the plane was near a fuel emergency, gave the pilots the option to either crash their plane with 240 people on board, or to divert to Oakland.
Oh please. Fuel emergency is not when the plane falls out of the sky. It is calculated as when the airplane has just enough fuel to go to the alternate airport plus multiple landing attempts there plus navigational reserve in case you get lost on the way there. The plane was not there, but just thinking about maybe being there soon. You know what you do when your primary airport is unable to land (for any reason) you are approaching the fuel emergency line? You head to your alternate, that is what it is for. And it is not some unheard of thing, this is literally how you have to calculate how much fuel you have to put in the airplane. When you take off you have to have enough fuel to get to your primary destination, waste your time there, then head to your alternate, get a bit lost on the way, have a go around on your secondary and then still have enough juice for a second landing.
> This is tough for me to wrap my head around.
Because you are thinking “oh my, oh my, the controler was risking so many lives”. When what the controller heard is that they still had plenty of fuel to go to their alternate, so he suggested that they do so.
You know what crashes airplanes and kills people? It is not airplanes flying to their alternate. It is plan continuation bias, or in laymen terms “get-there-itis”. It is when pilots want to reach their destination so much that they make poor decisions. Such as for example delaying leaving for their alternate until it is too late.
Being too polite crashed a plane that got diverted many times and run out of fuel (was on the cloudberg site). I think it may have been coming from Colombia IIRC. But that is super rare.
They kept asking for “Priority”
but never said “Emergency” or “Mayday” or “Pan Pan”
> > So this controller, knowing the plane was near a fuel emergency, gave the pilots the option to either crash their plane with 240 people on board, or to divert to Oakland.
> Oh please. Fuel emergency is not when the plane falls out of the sky. It is calculated as when the airplane has just enough fuel to go to the alternate airport plus multiple landing attempts there plus navigational reserve in case you get lost on the way there. The plane was not there, but just thinking about maybe being there soon. You know what you do when your primary airport is unable to land (for any reason) you are approaching the fuel emergency line? You head to your alternate, that is what it is for.
Well the point was that based on the time estimates that ATC gave the pilots assumed they would be well on the ground before they get close to the fuel emergency line. The pilot could have just been a dick and waited for his slot and until he has to declare emergency (which would have caused lots of trouble for at), instead he asked.
> You know what crashes airplanes and kills people? It is not airplanes flying to their alternate. It is plan continuation bias, or in laymen terms “get-there-itis”. It is when pilots want to reach their destination so much that they make poor decisions. Such as for example delaying leaving for their alternate until it is too late.
You know what also crashes airplanes, ATC, airports and airlines prioritising profits over safety (like it was the case here).
> Well the point was that based on the time estimates that ATC gave the pilots assumed they would be well on the ground before they get close to the fuel emergency line.
It happens. Sometimes ATC miscalculates this way. Sometimes a runway snows in suddenly. Sometimes there is a security incident. It doesn’t really matter why you need to land at your alternate, but when things don’t work out with your primary desination you go to your alternate.
Once everyone is safely on the ground, and the wheels stopped rolling we can ask if there could have been something ATC could have done better under the given constraint. Maybe the answer will be yes, this or that could have been done better to get the airplane on the ground at the right place. Or maybe the answer is no, simply there were too many other airplanes landing to do what the Lufthansa was asking for.
> The pilot could have just been a dick and waited for his slot and until he has to declare emergency.
Could have. And in the following investigation they would have been asked why have they not diverted.
> airports and airlines prioritising profits over safety (like it was the case here)
This was not a safety incident. This was an inconvinience incident.
When I first read the story, I thought ATC was at fault. But on further reading it's clear that the pilot was the one being unprofessional (threatening a fuel emergency as a bluff and then getting mad when ATC did the correct thing and offered vectors to the alternate).
Maybe there are systemic issues to be fixed here, but the plane was two hours late and wanted special privileges during the busiest time...
This is not a special Lufthansa thing. The majority of airlines from Europe limit visual approaches to daylight.
It does not apply to their home base, which is Frankfurt and Munich. The pilots are familiar with these airports, traffic patterns and so on.
Lufthansa tries to schedule outbound flights so that they arrive at daytime - if possible.
I don’t know why the controller was handling the situation that way. Taking flight duration and delay into account that was uncomfortable for the crew and passengers. And a waste of fuel. Mind the necessary repositioning of the plane, they had to move it to SFO later anyway.
I think it is tough when people discuss your work in public. And I’m not involved and lack knowledge! I hope the involved people learn and improve. We are all humans and make mistakes and/or misbehave. I have a lot to improve.
In Europe it is quite common for airline companies to only allow their aircrews visual approaches at their home bases (e.g. Amsterdam for KLM) or, in case the company uses several hubs, on those hubs.
Quote
I anssume access to the individual company procedures isn’t possible.
I got my pilot's license in the Bay Area and transited SFO's class bravo frequently. The region has one of the world's most complex airspaces (a B, two Cs, and a crap-ton of Ds), and SFO has a mind-boggling amount of traffic for an airport of its size. Based on my lived experience in that airspace, I think ATC did the best they could in a tough position, and I think that Lufthansa asking for special treatment is the asshole move. If they demand ILS in VFR conditions, they should schedule their arrival times to less-busy times.
Lufthansa does what the FAA recommends and SFO had air canada almost landing on the taxiway because of the visual approach not too long ago. So calling it an asshole move is turning things around.
It's not punishment. The reason air travel is so safe is because every near-miss is root-caused and policies are put in place to prevent the same cause from resulting in a future accident.
I mean, yes. Every single time there’s an aviation incident there’s an extremely thorough investigation and generally a set of concrete recommendations to go along with it.
Pilots are human, automated systems fail, and the goal is to maximize safety because these fuckups mean that 200-300 people on a single plane might die (or more if a plane crashes into another or into a populated area) and these safety regulations have saved a lot of lives.
ATC is supposed to accommodate to the best of their ability. Accommodating here could have been just waiting for a natural gap (which is what I think happened), but I think ATC should have just called Oakland center immediately and had a gap created for 10-20 minutes in the future. It is not like they were the only aircraft on the ILS approach that evening... Though, as I am not a norcal controller, maybe that is against policy.
The video posted by u/hansenq showed what flows were like, with traffic from the east sequenced as far out as Salt Lake City. It probably would’ve needed coordination with Oakland, LA, and Salt Lake centers
That doesn't add up with far-out sequencing.
As far as I understand all they needed to do was to move one plane down from the parallel pair and increase lateral spacing a tiny bit, all the way back while the plane in question was somewhere over Utah.
No, that's also not how it should work. Airports have a certain capacity, that's why you use slot allocations at crowded ones. You can say that day was so botched that they blew the one plane in fav of all the others, but that is not how it should work, telling a plane with an allocated slot you cannot even have a realistic estimate when we will fit you in.
You’re not wrong, but don’t forget that they were three hours late. This is really why airports operate on a first–come first–served basis; someone is always late.
> And IIRC, the FAA actually recommends foreign airlines adopt visual approach procedures at SFO, so … how does that make Lufthansa the assholes?
In 2013, temporarily:
> They also can use an instrument system called a glide slope indicator, although that has been out of service in San Francisco since June 1 because of ongoing runway improvements.
> The FAA said all foreign carriers should continue to use alternate instrument approaches until the glide slopes return to service in late August.
Because it is an FAA recommendation, not a rule. Lufthansa decided that they only do ILS at night and NorCal was not in a position to give them that in the near future because it would disrupt the flow of airplanes that could visual approaches at night and require less separation.
I am not 100% sure about the following but I think ATC instructions trumps company rules any day.
Understood, but I don’t think that makes Lufthansa the asshole here.
Between Lufthansa seemingly unaware of this situation in NorCal, and the ATC being prickly about it (the indefinite holding when they clearly had no intention of slotting them in), there’s plenty of assholes being assholes.
They normally do- this flight left MUC two hours late which was why it was part of the VFR landing sequence on this one day and is not normally a problem.
And the flight is twelve hours, with a filed flight plan. None of the controllers were even on-shift when SFO knew they'd need to have an ILS slot for the flight. That's why the pilot is exasperated when he finds out there isn't one.
It's like calling a year in advance for a dinner reservation and showing up and having to wait 45 minutes for your table "because it's a really busy night."
It’s not the ATCs job to get the plane down at the primary airport, on the pilot’s preferred schedule, in accordance with the airline’s policy of using ILS for landing at SFO at night. Any two would be a satisfactory outcome, and it sounds like the pilot could in fact have picked any two (well, it sounds like Lufthansa policy prohibited just getting in the VFR queue). Nobody was ever in danger and the worst case scenario was that the plane lands at Oakland, which was always a possibility from the moment they took off. If landing at Oakland is such a disaster Lufthansa could have canceled the flight once it became clear that they were running 3 hours late, had missed their originally planned slot, and would be landing at night.
> It's like calling a year in advance for a dinner reservation and showing up and having to wait 45 minutes for your table "because it's a really busy night."
It's more like showing up two weeks late to your dinner reservation, on a Valentine's Day Friday night rush, and being upset that you don't have an accurate ETA to get seated.
As a pilot, your first job is to fly the airplane, not listen to ATC.
A family member was a commercial airline pilot for many decades, and had stories of having to declare an emergency when ATC direction conflicted with facts in the air. ATC would get pissed, but they're safely on the ground.
Another family member was ATC, and so holiday dinners could be interesting.
> major airliner crash at JFK caused (partly) by poor communication between pilots and ATC
IMHO that doesn't accurately represent the NTSB's conclusions. They didn't cite ATC as a cause at all, only as a secondary contributing factor (along with the weather):
>> The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
>> probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to
>> adequately manage the airplane's fuel load, and their failure to
>> communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control
>> before fuel exhaustion occurred.
>> Contributing to the accident was the flightcrew's failure to use
>> an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during
>> the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather.
>> Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic flow
>> management by the FAA and the lack of standardized understandable
>> terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel
>> states.
>> The Safety Board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue and
>> stress were factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the
>> first approach and thus contributed to the accident.
Like in the youtube video's comments section, I suspect everyone on HN is going to assume that the ATC was simply being petty, and perhaps that was the case. But...
We don't know what the approach into SFO looked like that night, but you can bet it was busy. VASAviation videos are often highly misleading in this regard. Most of the talk on the ATC frequency is cut (sometimes explicitly, sometimes not) leaving just that relevant to the videos content, the time is compressed and they only plot a few of the planes involved, making the airspace look clear.
My understanding is that SFO often has two closely spaced parallel runways taking arrivals. The visual approach is preferred because then the pilots on parallel approaches keep visual separation from each other, allowing more frequent landings. An ILS approach requires more space between planes (because ATC remains responsible for separation). Hence, the Lufthansa had to wait for a gap big enough to fit that ILS approach in, or the whole stack of planes lined up for the approach would have to be juggled - how feasible that would be I don't know.
I live in West Menlo Park and often see planes overhead coming from the West or Northwest to the Bay. I didn't fully understand they may need to slot into a really long flow from the East and even the South.
The prior Philippine Airlines flight did get ILS due to a temporary gap. Lufthansa wasn't as fortunate. The guy on the video didn't think anyone was at fault based on his interpretation and the comments from his insider.
Just a clarifier for everyone - a fuel emergency is not what you think it is. They don’t run until the last drop. While it indicates the aircraft should be handled without delay, it’s also not going to fall out of the sky immediately either.
A fuel emergency would never be severe enough that they would be forced to land at SFO in this situation. In fact, if they were truly forced to land the pilots would lose their jobs because they left it way too late. Oakland was always a reasonable option.
Finally, fuel emergencies are not actually a standard call. It is a thing that is adhered to in the industry as courtesy. Unless there is a malfunction with the fuel system (which would be a mayday call) then it is mostly avoidable.
Depending on the issue and the pilots they can go straight to mayday, but that’s likely to to be “fuel is low because one wing is empty and the other is draining.”
Pilots can be d*cks, but recently there was a string of ATC related incidents, where ATC show questionable judgment and become too "moody" too soon.
Here is another example: https://twitter.com/jasonrosewell/status/1733645088473989245
JBU going too slow, instead of assigning a new speed and then scolding the pilot, ATC starts giving the attitude before telling him what he wants.
I see a huge problem here with "Everybody Knows", even among the people who sound like air transport professionals.
Lufthansa Requirement: Instrument landing
SFO Preference: Visual landing
Reason for Lufthansa requirement: IFR/ILS is safer than visual
Reason for SFO preference: Visual allows more planes with lower separation, leading to better throughput.
More context: Lufthansa would be using their instruments anyway, without declaring instrument flight rules landing. Declaring ILS in some generic sense is "safer", but specifically it means that the controllers cannot clear them to land in a degraded ILS environment, where perhaps some beacons are offline.
The SFO preference is not just something that the airport or the controller decided - it's also good for the airlines and the flying public. More planes land faster. The planes took off with the expectation that they would be able to land at a certain rate; otherwise they wouldn't schedule them to arrive so frequently.
The problem with "Everybody Knows" is that you really don't. The controller may assume that Lufthansa means "hey are all the beacons on?" when they say "IFR landing". Lufthansa may assume that IFR clearance means that the ILS equipment is operational, but that they can still fit into the VFR sequence.
In this case, those assumptions probably would have worked out Ok. But if "Everybody Knows" is part of your work culture and you work on life critical systems, than someone will eventually die, as you can see from the history of investigations into air transport incidents.
If you feel like someone is saying or implying "Everybody Knows" in a safety critical or life critical system, that is bad culture. Start documenting.
There's a better discussion of the Lufthansa situation at [1]. ILS landings require more spacing. The ILS system itself just shows the way to the runway, not what other aircraft are doing. In a visual approach in busy conditions, the pilot can see the aircraft ahead. In an ILS approach, it's assumed that they can't. This leads to ATC wanting to use visual approaches to get more planes landed.
The article seems to be misleading a little, because it was not 10 min in total.
Lufthansa asked for ILS, was put on hold for 20 min, then ATC promised another 10 minutes, and then 14 more min passed and this is when the pilot got frustrated.
After that extra 4 minute delay, the pilot made a bluff because he had get-there-itis and the ATC controller called the bluff. Honestly I don't see what the controller did wrong here. If anything was unprofessional it was threatening to call an emergency and then arguing with ATC
How is it get-there-itis for a pilot to have to remind air traffic control that they have not provided an update they are supposed to have provided?
Honestly I'm a little confused by some of the sentiment around this situation. Air traffic control is a service that airlines pay for, not little gods that cannot be questioned.
"if we are not set up for base soon, we will have to declare fuel emergency and that would really ** up your sequence" - pilot
That is 100% out of line. But the ATC handled it super professionally and offered them vectors to their alternate. The article suggests that ATC should've let the pilots declare a fuel emergency instead?
I...don't see how that is "100% out of line". Again I am very confused by the sentiment here - unless you are ignoring how much time the Lufthansa bird actually spent on hold (34 minutes before the statement you're quoting) and/or the regulations on (as well as the physical reality of) fuel consumption, jumping to the conclusion that the Lufthansa pilot is bluffing is very strange.
On top of that, the idea that the controller has carte blanche to "call [his] bluff" is patently absurd. So is the framing of diverting them to their alternate airport as "calling a bluff", when diverting to Oakland is exactly what the controller should have done from the beginning instead of giving them an ultimately wrong estimate and forgetting they were there.
Then again this is a board targeting the software dev industry, so I don't know why I'm surprised.
It was a bluff because either you're in a fuel emergency, or you aren't. He was trying to scare the ATC worker hoping they'd panic and slot him in to "avoid" the emergency. But that's not how any of it works. That's why it was a bluff.
The ATC being 4 minutes "late" for a callback during the busiest landing time does not mean the plane was "forgotten". 34 minutes is not very long to spend on hold, planes carry hours worth of reserve fuel. And estimates are just estimates, not a promise (like the article framed it as).
Honestly this is akin to someone showing up to the most popular restaurant in New York 2 hours late for their reservation, asking for a VIP room, then getting huffy when they don't have a VIP room within 30 minutes and then being angry they were offered a seat at the restaurant next door. (apparently the pilot, on the PA to passengers, was talking about taking legal action against ATC on the way to Oakland... ridiculous...)
I can't find a source, but I thought I read somewhere that these policies came following the Asiana Flight 214 crash [1], during which a plane did a visual approach to SFO instead of ILS. My understanding was that there was a rule change requiring ILS approaches at night at SFO, then the airlines implemented policies duplicating the rules in their policies, but then the rules were revoked - still leaving airline policies in place.
This is very unlikely, because Asiana 214 crash happens in broad daylight at 11:28am, so it could not possibly trigger a rule forbidding visual approach at night.
Recently there was a separation issue with a very similar night time visual approach into SFO.
It's not like trying to squeeze two flights into close parallel runways at the same time to maximizer capacity is a very safe thing to do considering everything that could go wrong
I really worry that SFO is going to have a major disaster. There have been so many close calls recently, the controllers have been making mistakes and acting out against pilots, there are 4 runway intersections (which other major airports are phasing-out), they have a fog problem, and an enormous amount of flow, and tons of air traffic and airports all around them.
I had a lufthansa flight cancelled due to company policy of how long you could sit on the tarmac. They had an instrument go bad, had a spare on hand but couldn't find it in time.
Flight got cancelled and I got rebooked for 4 days later. Which was after my business trip so I cancelled. I'm still waiting on my refund 3 months later. Everyone I speak to is nice, polite, agrees to refund me while saying but we'll have to call you back "because policy", pretty annoying. Whatever, i'll get it eventually I'm sure
That sounds particularly bad, EU261 should mean a reroute on another airline. Unless you were in a very isolated place with no spare seats 4 days would not be reasonable.
I thought I would just briefly pop into this thread to say that if I, as a passenger, were to learn that the flight* I was unexpectedly diverting across the bay, I just know I'd somehow embarrass myself from getting all hyphy about my "bonus" trip to Oaktown. Raising my daughter there through the grade school years conjures up some warm memories. Love that town.
But I'm not just here reppin' for Oakland – apparently, there's a lot of dysfunction at the FAA that I had no idea about. Glad I clicked.
The fuel emergency would have been literally a result of the ATC staff. Instead of this back and forth, the answer should have been - we cannot take you on ILS in the next X time, consider diverting.
Giving the sense of "we'll take you in within X minutes" to the pilot is disingenuous at best. ATCs job is literally safety.
That’s not how it works though. Before the pilots ever leave their starting airport they load up enough extra fuel to fly to their alternate airport and land there safely. Then they add on the “final reserve” fuel, which is enough fuel to fly for at least another half hour or 45 minutes (depending on airline and region). Together that fuel is called the “minimum fuel”. When an airplane gets down to minimum fuel it must declare that it has reached minimum fuel and is diverting to its alternate. They can only declare an emergency if they are down to the final reserve, and by that time they are expected to have already landed at their alternate. Unless their was a mechanical problem or a fuel leak, failing to divert before reaching minimum fuel would be an error by the pilots, not the ATC. Declaring an emergency just to skip ahead in line, when they still have not even reached minimum fuel yet, would not help the pilot’s career.
You are correct. Technically a fuel emergency should also be declared if the pilots expect to land with less than reserve fuel, not just when they are starting to consume the reserve.
If you get to that point and you haven't diverted you're losing your job AFAIK. "I just followed instructions and ended up in an emergency" won't fly. ATC isn't flying the plane.
What’s the big deal? Sounds like everything got negotiated just fine. SFO couldn’t accommodate an ILS landing at the moment, the Lufthansa flight required landing sooner, so they diverted. Some people got inconvenienced? That’s a shame.
Having watched the planes land at SFO at night provides an additional context. There are often two long streams of planes, like a spaced necklace, coming in to land. They look far apart when flying but then you notice just have fast another one comes.
And to those who fault the traffic controller - it is on the controller if something bad happens. Politeness, even a charge of grumpiness goes out the window in the face of that responsibility. Period. IMHO.
Being rude and grumpy a) tilts everyone else, b) everybody's cortisol levels to up, c) cortisol stress impairs cognition especially problem solving and interpersonal skills, d) thus INCREASING the risk of mistakes and accidents.
Modern psychology, more professionals should keep updated about it.
I see this as a reap what you sow moment for Lufthasa.
Why should ATC at a busy airport be so accommodating? Lufthasa is the one making this hard on everyone.
I used to watch both these airports fairly frequently from Oyster bay regional park, they are both super busy with flights often lining up to the horizon.
"Why should ATC at a busy airport be so accommodating? Lufthasa is the one making this hard on everyone."
It is literally ATC's job to facilitate the safe separation of aircraft. Note I said facilitate, not ensure, because ensuring safe separation and operation remains in the cockpit. When a pilot arrives at an airport and requests a specific approach, whether that reason is company policy or the limitations of weather, it is ATC's job to accept that request or deny it, and not to beat around the bush suggesting doing one thing and calling it another. When they give an expected time for something the pilot makes decisions in the cockpit if that new limitation will work with whatever limitations already exist. If ATC is not operating honestly then that should be viewed as what it is - a compromise of safety, and a petty unnecessary one at that. If ATC is unable to accommodate the request then it needs to be stated so explicitly and as soon as possible because lives are literally part of the equation. Air traffic can be lined up from SFO all the way back to London and that still doesn't change ATC's responsibilities one bit. ATC does not "accommodate" because that implies they exercise some arbitrary discretion and not clear binary criteria.
This wasn't some new policy of Lufthansa though, apparently it's their SOP for basically all airports. Outside the US, I'm not sure if visual approaches are all that common for (heavy) aircraft at night. Overall, the reason that SFO wants visual approaches is to increase rate of landing, and the reason that Lufthansa wants ILS is to increase safety -- your phrasing "Lufthasa is the one making this hard on everyone" just seems wrong, having more safety seems totally justified and reasonable here.
I'm actually surprised SFO still allows visual approaches at night after that Air Canada 759 flight nearly landed on the taxiway ~5 years ago (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQlQFn0euI).
Instrument approaches are the norm in Europe, visual approaches are the norm in the US. Visual approaches can and normally do still use ILS when possible; SFO's incidents were when ILS was out of service (Asiana 214) or not engaged (Air Canada 759)
Which is why ATC obliquely asked whether Lufthansa bans visual approaches altogether, or simply requires the use of ILS. If it had been the latter, that's fully compatible with normal SFO operations.
> I'm actually surprised SFO still allows visual approaches at night after that Air Canada 759 flight nearly landed on the taxiway ~5 years ago
The Air Canada incident happened because one of the runways at SFO was closed for maintenance, and after it happened the FAA specifically updated their regulations to require ILS when there's a possibility of runway confusion. There's no reason to think VFR landings at SFO are unsafe in normal conditions.
> There's no reason to think VFR landings at SFO are unsafe in normal conditions.
"No reason" seems like a very strong claim. Is that the reason Lufthansa cites for prohibiting visual separation at night? I mean it would clearly be in their interest to increase throughput as well, so they must think there's a reason. Why do you think that reason is invalid?
I'm surprised a computer assisted landing sequence can't _increase_ the rate of landed planes, though I assume doing so would require subordinating all the inbound aircraft to the local traffic control system.
The problem with having computer separation be less than pilot separation is, what happens if the computers fail and the pilots have to take over? Then they're suddenly in a situation where they're already below whatever the minimum safe pilot separation is, and now you've potentially turned a recoverable failure into an unrecoverable one. If the whole point of having pilots is to be backups for the computers, the computer situation has to have more margin than the equivalent pilot one, even if efficiency is being left on the table.
(The only way around this is to not have pilots as backup, and turn the whole thing over to the computers, but we're not ready or willing to take that step yet)
'go around' but with different registered abort vectors / plans.
Also if any unit within the stack falls out of automatic mode the entire chain gets cleared; if there's sufficient window for the pilots to declare emergency manual landing they can maintain the path as everything else aborts and the failed unit lands.
Considering that only one runway (28R, IIRC) at SFO even winks in direction of supporting autoland, and there's no continental USA support for controller-pilot datalink (only used for oceanic flight), at least outside of test flights (correctme if I'm wrong, not an expert here).
On top of that current CPDLC doesn't seem to be as well integrated to autopilot support other than pilots acking each command, and then I do not think Mode S is mandated (or exact enough) to provide good enough separation.
> reason that Lufthansa wants ILS is to increase safety
Yes because "more technology is more better" right? And forgetting about how to do things by hand (or eye) doesn't pose a risk to anyone neither
A visual approach is no more unsafe than an ILS one in good weather. Sure, ok, the caveat here is "at night" but I don't think the multiple pilots that were doing it at the time were being risky on purpose
(and people are quoting Asiana, but understand that fumbling a visual approach landing is not a thing that should be common)
> Yes because "more technology is more better" right? And forgetting about how to do things by hand (or eye) doesn't pose a risk to anyone neither
That's a very nifty strawman, but that's not my claim (at least not in such a general way). In this case it's become SOP by experts in a field, specifically for safety reasons. Other experts in the field have said "well, we don't think it's necessary - there are downsides such as aircraft landing rate". These groups of experts don't disagree on the fact that it's more safe - they just disagree as to what the optimal combination of (safety, financial value) is appropriate.
(speaking about strawmen) I'm not saying ILS is less safe
I'm saying that have people rely on ILS and never practice visual landings, especially when the conditions are favourable, makes pilots lose skill and confidence on it, making the overall situation less safe
Then people wonder how come other pilots miss a perfect good approach on a sunny day.
Apparently some Canadian carriers do also have this as a SOP.
Around the time this happened I spoke to some friends who are ATCs (in the US) who all immediately agreed it was a very reasonable request, especially given that the request was made far enough out (so it wasn't like they'd have to quickly scramble to respace the incoming planes correctly in the sequence).
Because Lufthansa left a few hours late they arrived during a super busy arrival window. AFAIK ATC had nearly 30 planes already in the queue for landing with spacing for visual. To get Lufthansa in any sooner they'd need to send updated instructions to a lot of planes to make a gap.
If Lufthansa had arrived two hours earlier or later it wouldn't have been an issue. Indeed they were able to depart OAK around two hours later and land at SFO via IFR with no problems.
SFO handles a lot of traffic for having just two active runways - one of the reasons they constantly operate in parallel. Much like other super busy constrained airports (eg JFK) they have very little room to accommodate special requests.
Ideally Lufthansa would have let ATC know of this need while still a long way out so they could build a bubble in the sequence ahead of time but I don't know if procedures even allow for that.
> It's so "justified and reasonable" that nobody else does it.
Airlines are a cutthroat business and many will go for profit rather than for safety if they're allowed to. The large American airlines, for what it's worth, are actually loss leaders [1].
The controller didn't have an ETA, the pilot was offered to hold or divert. The pilot didn't want to divert, and hoped that complaining would get them out of the hold.
From a safety perspective, this all seems to have worked as intended.
Yeah, whether Lufthansa's polices are reasonable or excessively cautious is debatable, but the ATC here obviously gave unambiguously wrong information about the delay.
Estimates and predictions that turn out to be wrong are still wrong.
And when the estimate was wrong by 50% and counting, and the ATC wasn't offering any information other than another dubious estimate, and the ATC was not handling the flights in a FIFO order, the Lufthansa pilots were left with uncomfortably little useful information about their situation.
Just a note the estimate wasn't just wrong by 50% the pilots had already been told 10min twice before, so estimate was more than 300% off by that time.
That also means that when ATC tells someone they will inform them in 10 minutes,they are obliged to tell them in 10 minutes, even if it's "sorry, we don't have a slot, we can get you info in next ten minutes or help you to diversion airport".
Not have to be reminded that there's a plane in holding waiting for information.
Unless they want a repeat of telling a plane to hold till it crashed into sea.
> Why should ATC at a busy airport be so accommodating?
Apropos of the other issues already being well debated:
1. ATCs role is to facilitate use of the airport.
2. They/the airport are being paid by Lufthansa to do so:
~$4,000 landing fee based on the OEW + 5% fuel being 340,000lb at $9.11/1000 lb.
~$800 for up to 8 hours at a gate (or a flat rate of $36,000/mo per aircraft for a frequently visiting ship).
~$1,000 for common use of terminal facilities (for airlines that don't have dedicated terminals - often with internationals, where they have the common check in area that is used by multiple airlines).
And that's not all the charges the airline gets from the airport, that's just the majority of the charges for "1 aircraft, 1 landing/departure" at SFO.
Yes, landing fees are public and in most countries are set same for everyone based on type of aircraft and sometimes operations, but not who is flying.
They are supposed to directly reflect funding of airport maintenance, thus fees decided based on how damaging the plane is to the runway etc.
Additionally, there's a whole laundry list of charges you can see on most international flight tickets. For example on my last flight ticket from Nigeria (my country of residence) to the US with United, there are Nigeria-specific sales taxes and airport service charge fees listed as well as two separate US Customs and Immigrations fees, a "September 11th Security fee", and a US transportation tax.
> Why should ATC at a busy airport be so accommodating?
Is it really so much to ask that an ILS-equipped airport... provide an ILS approach?
I'm generally on your side here; the controllers did a good job with what resources they had. But there seem to be an awful lot of oddities / operational hangups through NorCal TRACON.
Driving south on a clear night on Highway 101, from SFO on down, is a neat experience because you can see these planes lined up clearly for about 20 miles. All the way down to the South Bay and beyond.
Regardless of what everyone is saying about the controller, I think the pilots behavior was disrespectful (to both ATC and to the lives of those on their plane) and unprofessional.
You don’t get to cry wolf and cut the line because you were late and want preferential treatment. Go to Oakland as told, wait, or declare an actual emergency for emergency procedures to be run for you.
They were put in holding pattern with estimate of 10min, 20min later they again get told it will be another 10min and after 14mins go by the pilot asks "hey you have been repeatedly putting me off with 10min estimates I'm about to run low on fuel" how is that disrespectful?
They just are not allowed follow policy designed to eventually kill people. Seems reasonable to me... And the ATC knew that plane with that policy was coming and were not prepared to create sufficient slot for safe landing instead of their unsafe one.
So much talk of who's at fault here, but what strikes me is that it ever got to this point. I feel like competence is at an all-time low in recorded history. Maybe we need to take a step back and go back to horse-drawn carriages until we've re-learned how to be responsible. I have a flight this week and this isn't helping my anxiety.
Think about it the other way around: this incident wasn't even close to an actual emergency – and it still gets a lot of discussion because it's so rare that it happens.
> well know the FAA has been totally deprived of ability to remedy these issues.
Other people are blaming the FAA for understaffing ATC and making it too hard to become a pilot, to the point of excluding otherwise-good would-be pilots.
I haven't before heard someone say that the FAA has been deprived of its ability to remedy these issues. Can you go into more detail on that?
I’m sure the industry has standards for assigning blame, but it looks to me that ATC is clearly being assholes here.
Even from this article that clearly seems to think Lufthansa is in the wrong I walked away with a feeling that ATC and small town cops are one and the same.
The current top comment on the article explains the situation, and ATC are "not being assholes here":
>NorCal had a new interpretation of ILS approaches come down several months ago that tied the controllers hands with regards to ILS approaches during visual conditions... The controllers were issued guidelines that if it’s busy and an aircraft is unable to comply with the approaches advertised on the atis or maintain visual separation that its better to hold them until there is adequate space on final as it’s more unsafe to start vectoring 30/40 different aircraft to build the required hole for the 1 aircraft who’s company has a lame rule
> The controller clears the Lufthansa jet to make a visual approach, and the Lufthansa pilot advises “due to company procedures, we are unable visual approach at nighttime”
> The controller then advises that “if that’s the case, then it will be extended delays”
The individual controller won’t know exactly how many airplanes are ahead of this one, and even if they did they can only estimate the delay. In this case the estimate they gave the plane turned out to be optimistic, because the planes ahead of them were taking longer to land than expected. Certainly saying “This conversation is over” would be rude in most circumstances, but it merely reflects the reality that a controller can only spend so much time talking to each crew. The crew already had all the information the controller could give them, and simply needed to make a decision rather than ask more questions.
I'm pretty sure they did.. the article says controller told them there would be "extended delays". Sounds like the pilot just got impatient when ATC couldn't get him on the ground after 10 minutes.
No, the pilot got inpatient when the controller told them the next info will be in 10 minutes (reasonable, shit happens) and did not contact them at that point -the pilot even had to remind the ATC they were supposed to update the flight.
Norcal is an amazing bunch of people with a high stress life-and-death job. They're incredibly accommodating, but when the system is at capacity it's at capacity. SFO is a very special airport with a traffic flow much higher than its footprint would normally allow. Since there is pretty nowhere for it to expand, the only option would be to reduce the number of slot times, which for a business hub like SFO would be terrible.
Their article implied that every other airline was happy with the procedure, so it seems like Lufthansa decided that they don't want to train their pilots. Was this an exceptional day at SFO? From my experience of SFO, doesn't seem like it (too many planes, too little time).
So are you saying that it's just dangerous to fly on the other airlines into SFO?
This is coming from someone who only has experience as a commercial flight passenger, but I would expect AI to be very promising for ATC. Obviously there are various concerns ranging from potential attack vectors and the need for failsafes if any automated system fails, but has this been explored?
Current AI is nowhere close to be good enough for that. After all, there are literally hundreds of lives at stake every given minute, not sure you want some whacked together ML model or other run your aircrafts landing approach in bad wheather and high traffic.
That is satire, right? We can discuss more/better automation and tooling aids and planning aids and whatever tech.. there are so many options you can bring in there before even thinking of any $+#(&#&$ AI in safety critical things?! Exploring what, the many ways it could hilariously fail?
Basically, SFO normally does VFR parallel approaches at night. Approach sequences these approaches miles beforehand, so there can be a chain of 10-20 aircraft all sequenced to land before responsibility is even transferred to SFO's tower. The incident happened during a particularly busy landing time at SFO, so there was indeed a massive chain of aircraft coming in to land.
Lufthansa was the only aircraft asking for ILS. Because ILS needs greater separation, that would require breaking the chain of approaches, sequencing a single ILS approach, then resuming. The chain of landings already sequenced takes priority, so Lufthansa would have to wait 30+ minutes for a gap to appear. By the time that gap appeared, Lufthansa had just decided to divert to Oakland. If Lufthansa had arrived a bit earlier or a bit later, they would have been sequenced just fine.
ATC could have been a bit more accommodating in rerouting their divert to SFO as soon as the a gap appeared, but Lufthansa was also the only airline requesting ILS, and they're already dealing with sequencing 20+ aircraft during a busy time. It's not clear who's in the wrong here; just an unintended consequence from many well-intentioned decisions.