This theory conveniently ignores that streetcar companies also have lobbying power, and lobbying to stay the status quo is much more successful than lobbying for radical change.
Streetcar companies were universally reviled (as most effective monopolies tend to be, like US cable or power companies), and their status quo actually was worse than what was being introduced for cars, because they pretty much all had flat price caps and were expected to pay maintenance for city streets they operated on.
It also doesn't help that a fair amount of streetcars were just land speculation plays (let's sell all this land that's newly accessible!). When they needed full replacement and renewal, they no longer had anything to finance it with.
I mean you are also ignoring the externalities that had effects on lobbying power like not being able to set their own fares, might have effected the amount of money they had to lobby?
I wonder what the difference is compared to subway trains. Similar local lobbying vs national auto lobbying dynamics, and subways didn't suffer the same extinction.
Is it just switching costs being lower for streetcars? Or maybe the fact subways are underground means they don't battle in a zero sum pavement game with cars, so they were more immune to tides of public opinion and city administration?
