Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

anyone care to expand on the practical applications/implications/threat model where this makes sense?


It's for when you trust someone but don't want to risk either your or their device being compromised in the future. For instance:

- if your or their phone gets taken at a border crossing

- if your or their phone gets taken by the FBI (which is how they recovered encrypted WhatsApp/Signal chats from Michael Cohen's phone)

- etc


Or in a much simpler and common case: you trust someone right now to run a non-modified client and not to take screenshots, for example based on a corporate policy.

Months later the relationship turns sour, and they are fired or denied a promotion. They can't then go through the archives any more to take the screenshots.


thank you - this is what i was looking for


It works as long as no one takes a screenshot.


Or even extract the text + signature before it "explodes". Keybase messages don't have repudiability so anybody who has received a sign message should be considered to always have that message.


Though the FAQ at the bottom of the article suggests some sort of minimal repudiation support is in the works.


Apparently those dank memes and corporate espionage according to the article are some of the uses.




Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: