Thanks for the explanation especially with the example.
I now understand what you meant by "unsound refinement" and the desire to keep the spec readable.
> and that's what I did in a complex spec
Do you believe that your hands were tied because the mapping can only be a projection of state?
Is this spec and the corresponding implementation that you are working on in public domain ?
> We really need a model checker that can handle temporal quantification.
Do you intend to restrict the quantification only over time variable only ? Why do I ask this? This is because even in presence of finite stuttering, one only needs to analyze about state and the successors ?
If you intend to quantify over state variables (including the prophecy/history variable, for instance in the example you mentioned) -- that is a more general problem of dealing with quantifiers and there is still long way to automate that aspect.
> Is this spec and the corresponding implementation that you are working on in public domain ?
Not currently. Maybe in the future.
> Do you believe that your hands were tied because the mapping can only be a projection of state?
Rather than? I'm not sure I understand the question, so maybe. My problem is that some reductions require moving certain transitions backwards or forwards in time. In theory, the idea is described well in section 3 of this paper https://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/lamport/pubs/... (this is pretty much exactly my problem: I wanted to see if a distributed transaction is a refinement of an atomic transaction). In practice, using prophecy variables isn't easy.
> Do you intend to restrict the quantification only over time variable only?
Oh, no, in TLA "temporal quantification" means hidden state, or quantifiers over state variables. Having the model checker handle that would make auxiliary variables unnecessary in cases where the more abstract specification has hidden internal state (unless you want a deductive proof). It will save us the hardest work, and ensure that the implementation relation is sound (no auxiliary variables necessary).
It would have solved my problem, too. Even though auxiliary variables would still be necessary, the model-checker could check that they're sound by checking:
S ⇒ (∃∃ aux : S_with_aux)
to see that adding the auxiliary variables doesn't restrict the spec (and then I could check, as I do today, that `S_with_aux ⇒ Abstract_S`)
> My problem is that some reductions require moving certain transitions backwards or forwards in time.
This is definitely a more involved problem. A cleaner solution, I believe, requires a new notion of correctness than trace containment/simulation up to stuttering. This is because neither of these notions allow one to move forward or backward observable transitions. The key here is to differentiate between non-observable and observable non-determinism. While the former can be accounted by using prophecy variable in linear time framework or directly in the branching time framework. I will recommend reading the comparison of the two approaches in [1]. However, the later is not what can be accounted by adding auxiliary variables. It is done currently by complicating a simple sequential specification -- create a new specification that includes all possible interleaving of transitions implicitly or explicitly. I will be curious to hear your insights on this while using TLA+ in particular and Lamport's theory of refinement in general.
I must say that the above must be at best considered speculative from a practical methodology point of view. I do suggest a concrete alternative nor do I have extensive experience in validating actual distributed systems.
> Rather than? I'm not sure I understand the question, so maybe
This is the easier part and a less speculative comment :).
In the theory of refinement in branching-time framework developed in [1,2] the refinement can be any computable function rather than just a projection of states space. This often is very helpful. For example a refinement map for a pipelined processor is defined by invalidating all partially executed instructions and setting the program counter to the oldest instruction in flight. This is relatively more involved than just a projection map that "hides" the internal states. Notice that, as we have already mentioned earlier, branching time refinement implies trace containment, a linear-time notion. So there is nothing lost. There are follow up papers with case studies illustrating the use of this flexibility to define refinement map that makes automated reasoning more amenable.
Thanks for clarifying the temporal quantification.
I read the paper in the first link, and I may read it again, but I have a few remarks:
1. Refinement mappings in TLA also allow arbitrary state functions.
2. There are very good reasons to want machine closure, and one of the things mentioned at the end of that paper as an advantage (that there is no necessity in a separate liveness property), is actually a serious disadvantage.
Let me give you an example, using what Lamport calls "raw" TLA, which is TLA which is not stuttering invariant:
Spec1 ≜ t = 1 ∧ x = 1 ∧ ◻(t' = t + 1 ∧ x' = x + 10)
Spec2 ≜ t = 1 ∧ x ∈ Nat ∧ ◻(t' = t + 1 ∧ x' = x + 10 ∧ t = 10 ⇒ x = 100)
The two specifications specify the same behavior. But, in this world, a safety property can imply a liveness property, e.g. x ∈ Nat ∧ ◻(x' = x + 10) ⇒ ◇(x ≥ 100)
Now, this is bad because the second specification is actually not implementable in a computer with complexity similar to that of the behavior as it relies on "angelic" nondeterminism. It is possible to use angelic nondeterminism in TLA (it's important for high-level specs) like so:
Spec3 ≜ t = 1 ∧ x ∈ Nat ∧ ◻[t' = t + 1 ∧ x' = x + 10 ∧ t = 10 ⇒ x = 100]_<t, x> ∧ ◇(t ≥ 10)
(the square brackets mean that either the action is true, or <t, x> are unchanged) But now, the liveness property is not implied by the safety property, and it requires an explicit statement in the formula. That last formula, Spec3, is not machine-closed, and this makes it easier to see that the algorithm implied is unrealizable as written.
> 1. Refinement mappings in TLA also allow arbitrary state functions.
Could you please point me to a reference for this. The completeness result from "The existence of refinement mapping" only includes projection. I know that TLA does allow existential quantification over internal variables (corresponds to hiding) and one can eliminate the quantifier by defining a function. But notice that is just the logical way of specifying "hiding" and is different from having arbitrary refinement mapping.
>2. There are very good reasons to want machine closure ...
Definitely. However, these are the concerns when we are specifying a system -- is the specification correctly models the system that I have in mind. While the comments in the paper -- no necessity to separately analyze liveness -- refers to the easy while proving that a concrete specification "implements" an abstract specification. And this is what your example specifications illustrates (thanks for specific examples, it helped me to understand the point you are making).
> I know that TLA does allow existential quantification over internal variables (corresponds to hiding) and one can eliminate the quantifier by defining a function.
That's what I meant. The functions do not necessarily apply to hidden variables only, but to any variable. E.g., in TLA+, if Spec1 has variable x and Spec2 has variables q and t, you could write:
Spec2 ⇒ INSTANCE Spec1 WITH x ← q + t
Which implements Spec to by mapping (q + t) to x.
> But notice that ... is different from having arbitrary refinement mapping.
Can you explain what you mean?
> However, these are the concerns when we are specifying a system -- is the specification correctly models the system that I have in mind.
Right, but you want an easy way to determine if a specification is machine-closed or not. TLA provides a sufficient syntactic condition. A specification is guaranteed to be machine closed if it can be written as
Init ∧ ◻[M]_vars ∧ Fairness
Where M is an action and `Fairness` is a conjunction of ⬦ clauses containing WF/SF (weak/strong fairness) conditions only. In fact, when testing safety properties alone (which is normally the case), a specification is usually just
Init ∧ ◻[M]_vars
Which TLA guarantees is machine-closed. Otherwise, a ◻ formula alone may not be machine-closed (and may imply a liveness property, like in my example above), and proving whether it is or it isn't may be non-trivial.
I now understand what you meant by "unsound refinement" and the desire to keep the spec readable.
> and that's what I did in a complex spec
Do you believe that your hands were tied because the mapping can only be a projection of state?
Is this spec and the corresponding implementation that you are working on in public domain ?
> We really need a model checker that can handle temporal quantification.
Do you intend to restrict the quantification only over time variable only ? Why do I ask this? This is because even in presence of finite stuttering, one only needs to analyze about state and the successors ?
If you intend to quantify over state variables (including the prophecy/history variable, for instance in the example you mentioned) -- that is a more general problem of dealing with quantifiers and there is still long way to automate that aspect.