I thought a similar thing myself. The USB drive seems to be the weakest spot of this whole thing, especially with how prevalent USB-based infections are (Stuxnet, anyone?), and the fact that sophisticated enough malware can operate completely autonomously.
I also wonder what other things they may have locked down on the laptop itself to try to stymie key exfiltration? I assume they pulled the wifi/bluetooth chip, but what about the speakers? After all - the whole ceremony is being broadcast live, and depending on the audio degradation from the live stream the speakers may actually be stable enough for successful data exfil.
I'm also curious if they attempt to do any power cleaning/shielding to prevent any forms of tempest monitoring?
> I also wonder what other things they may have locked down on the laptop itself to try to stymie key exfiltration?
The private keys are in the HSM, a separate device (according to the article, connected by an Ethernet cable). The laptop doesn't have access to them.
The main risk I can imagine would be a compromised laptop signing a different KSR which has extra keys, and saving it in a hidden area of the USB key, while pretending to sign the original KSR (and presenting the hashes of the original KSR to the operators).
I also wonder what other things they may have locked down on the laptop itself to try to stymie key exfiltration? I assume they pulled the wifi/bluetooth chip, but what about the speakers? After all - the whole ceremony is being broadcast live, and depending on the audio degradation from the live stream the speakers may actually be stable enough for successful data exfil.
I'm also curious if they attempt to do any power cleaning/shielding to prevent any forms of tempest monitoring?