1. The externalities cost of data exposure is fully realised. What is Ashley Madison's liability for suicides of members attributed to its data leak? Or of the multi-generational impacts of fractured families (immediate plus affected children, possibly parents of spouses who split on account of the breech). A frequently leveled compaint about "remediation" for data disclosure is that it does little to address the full costs to those victimised by it.
AM is all the more interesting in that, as Annalee Newitz's investigative reporting reveals: not only were personal data collected, but (at least for straight males), it wasn't for the stated purpose: "Ashley Madison created more than 70,000 female bots to send male users millions of fake messages, hoping to create the illusion of a vast playland of available women." In fact, it was a feeder system to a set of bots, "affiliates", and, it seems, escort services.
2. It assumes the market is rational. Enron's market capitalisation was $60 billion on December 31, 2000, prior to its collapse. The share price fell from $0.75 to less than one dollar by November, 2001, its bankruptcy filing was dated December 2, 2001.
The larger problem: what is seen cannot be unseen.
An exceptionally peculiar aspect of digital data is that, while it may remain in the boxes and cages provided for it, it's got a notable tendency to find itself liberated. Often without warning, and not detected for days, weeks, months, or longer, afterward (as in this case). In the real world we've got friction, especially associated with data processing and transfer. In digital form, far less so. Sometimes friction is good.
Finally: that's the market for tools to analyse the data, not for the data itself. Big Data is a current business fad. Companies are told they must capitalise on Big Data, so they buy miracle solutions to do that. Some can, and in cases spectacularly. Many cannot -- the added value-per-customer is small, or, in the case of breach, negative.
This assumes that:
1. The externalities cost of data exposure is fully realised. What is Ashley Madison's liability for suicides of members attributed to its data leak? Or of the multi-generational impacts of fractured families (immediate plus affected children, possibly parents of spouses who split on account of the breech). A frequently leveled compaint about "remediation" for data disclosure is that it does little to address the full costs to those victimised by it.
AM is all the more interesting in that, as Annalee Newitz's investigative reporting reveals: not only were personal data collected, but (at least for straight males), it wasn't for the stated purpose: "Ashley Madison created more than 70,000 female bots to send male users millions of fake messages, hoping to create the illusion of a vast playland of available women." In fact, it was a feeder system to a set of bots, "affiliates", and, it seems, escort services.
http://gizmodo.com/ashley-madison-code-shows-more-women-and-...
2. It assumes the market is rational. Enron's market capitalisation was $60 billion on December 31, 2000, prior to its collapse. The share price fell from $0.75 to less than one dollar by November, 2001, its bankruptcy filing was dated December 2, 2001.
The larger problem: what is seen cannot be unseen.
An exceptionally peculiar aspect of digital data is that, while it may remain in the boxes and cages provided for it, it's got a notable tendency to find itself liberated. Often without warning, and not detected for days, weeks, months, or longer, afterward (as in this case). In the real world we've got friction, especially associated with data processing and transfer. In digital form, far less so. Sometimes friction is good.
Finally: that's the market for tools to analyse the data, not for the data itself. Big Data is a current business fad. Companies are told they must capitalise on Big Data, so they buy miracle solutions to do that. Some can, and in cases spectacularly. Many cannot -- the added value-per-customer is small, or, in the case of breach, negative.