There wasn't market manipulation here on GDAX's part. The people they are compensating are those who got wiped because they were trading on margin (if anyone is not familiar, this adds much more risk). These people already had their portfolios auto-liquidated via the margin call so stopping trading afterwards had no impact. Same with stop loss orders, although there's a different mechanism at play there.
From GDAX's point of view the tradeoff boiled down to whether to invest in PR / brand today or risk a moral hazard problem in the future (users expecting bailouts so they take more risk).
There isn't a lot of substance but the Enron comparison is awfully loaded. The article specifically calls out the use of off balance sheet entities to hide costs-- for people who follow this stuff, that immediately triggers memories of Enron's use of special purpose entities and Lehman's Repo 105 off balance sheet shenanigans.
Yea, I think the industry seems to have been caught off guard by how aggressive the mutual funds have been with their mark-to-market valuations. This public data will likely have to be factored into the valuation methodologies of the private investors in these deals. Absent of this, Unicorn valuations were probably going to take a much longer time to deflate.
