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Thanks for the feedback! One small bit of clarification, the framework would describe access to any sensitive system as part of the [B] circle, not only private systems or private data.

The intention is that an agent that has removed [B] can write state and communicate freely, but not with any systems that matter (wrt critical security outcomes for its user). An example of an agent in this state would be one that can take actions in a tight sandbox or is isolated from production.


Thanks for that! I've updated my post to link to this clarification and updated my screenshots of your diagram to catch the new "lower risk" text as well: https://simonwillison.net/2025/Nov/2/new-prompt-injection-pa...


Hey folks, one of the authors of the original post here.

First, I want to thank simonw for coming up with the lethal trifecta (our direct inspiration for this work) as well as all of the great feedback we’ve received from Simon and others! Our goal with publishing this framework was to inspire precisely these types of discussions so our industry can move our understanding of these risks forward.

Regarding the concerns over the venn diagram labeling certain intersections sections as “safe”, this is 100% valid and we’ve updated it to be more clear. The goal of the Rule of Two is not to describe a sufficient level of security for agents, but rather a minimum bar that’s needed to deterministically prevent the highest security impacts of prompt injection. The earlier framing of “safe” did not make this clear.

Beyond prompt injection there are other risks that have to be considered, which we briefly describe in the Limitations section of the post. That said, we do see value in having the Rule of Two to frame some of the discussions around what unambiguous constraints exist today because of the unsolved risk of prompt injection.

Looking forward to further discussion!


Blog post announcement as well: https://blog.securityinnovation.com/blockchain-ctf

Happy to answer any questions!


The lack of auth and encryption is only part of the problem with Stratum's implementation. At Toorcamp 2014 I presented about the vulnerabilities discovered when looking into common miners and their impact on the network. More details available in the associated white paper:

http://www.dejavusecurity.com/blog/2014/7/15/bitcoin-researc...


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