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Turned this into a science experiment and designed a test/workflow to rename the symbol MatrixXd -> MatrixPd in eigen and the results are promising at first glance. See https://github.com/rhobimd-oss/shebe/blob/main/WHY_SHEBE.md#...


shebe asks the simple question: "where does this symbol appear as text?". For C++ codebases that heavily use templates and macros, shebe will struggle. But I'm curious how it would actually perform, so I'm currently performing a search on https://gitlab.com/libeigen/eigen. Will report the results shortly.


When using AI coding assistants to refactor symbols across large codebases (6k+ files), developers face a binary choice: precision (LSP-based tools) or efficiency (grep/ripgrep). Shebe attempts to address this trade-off by way of a good old BM25 index, which is surprisingly fast and efficient.


Agentic refactoring was such a chore I ended up building this for my refactoring workflows.

https://gitlab.com/rhobimd-oss/shebe/-/blob/main/docs/guides...

https://gitlab.com/rhobimd-oss/shebe/-/tree/main?ref_type=he...

Then in skills or CLAUDE.md I instruct claude to use this mcp tool to enumerate all files need changing/updating.


Is it possible to still somehow download fleet,does anyone have idk an exe or something or know a website where It is still possible?


Also communal RFCs, RFPs, Roadmapping, Architecture/Design Proposals, Design Docs and/or Reviews help socialize/diffuse org standards and expectations.

I found these help ground the mentorship and discussions between junior-senior devs. And so even for the enterprising aka proactive junior devs who might start working on something in advance of plans/roadmaps, by the time they present that work for review, if the work followed org architectural and design patterns, the review and acceptance process flows smoothly.

In my juinior days I was taught: if the org doesn't have a design or architectural SOP for the thing you're doing, find a couple of respectable RFCs from the internet, pick the three you like, and implement one. It's so much easier to stand on the shoulders of giants than to try and be the giant yourself.


This was still practice at $BIG_FINANCE in the couple of years just before covid, although by that point such team reviews were reducing in importance and prominence.


Hahaha OP could be in deep trouble depending on what types of creds/data they had in that container. I had replied to a child comment but I figure best to reply to OP.

From the root container, depending on volume mounts and capabilities granted to the container, they would enumerate the host directories and find the names of common scripts and then overwrite one such script. Or to be even sneakier, they can append their malicious code to an existing script in the host filesystem. Now each time you run your script, their code piggybacks.

OTOH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here. The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh} Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.


Luckily umami in docker is pretty compartimentalized. All data is in the and the DB runs in another container. The biggest thing is the DB credentials. The default config requires no volume mounts so no worries there. It runs unprivileged with no extra capabilities. IIRC don't think the container even has bash, a few of the exploits that tried to run weren't able to due to lack of bash in the scripts they ran.

Deleting and remaking the container will blow away all state associated with it. So there isn't a whole lot to worry about after you do that.


You could just chain this with another exploit, just because it doesn’t run as root by default doesn’t mean it’s not a big deal.


Nothing in that container luckily, just what Umami needed to run, so no creds at all. Thanks for the info though!


Another example is they would enumerate your directories and find the names of common scripts and then overwrite your script. Or to be even sneakier, they can append their malicious code to an existing script in your filesystem. Now each time you run your script, their code piggybacks.

OTH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here.

The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh}

Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.


If your chosen development environment supports it, look into distroless or empty base containers, and run as --read-only if you can.

Go and Rust tend to lend themselves to these more restrictive environments a bit better than other options.


Which investors? Mozilla make money from search engine placement on their browser. If their browser stinks, as it will if they keep pursuing these orthogonal projects, you think google will pay $400MM per year to be the default search engine on there?


Insurance. You'll get fired if the AI is wrong.


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