Still. I understand the officers having "qualified immunity". But not the agency.
If an agency has shitty officers doing dodgy stuff, it's on the agency. The agents may be declared immune to direct litigation, but any claims and reparations should be automatically shifted to the agency.
If the agency has become corrupt, tweaking immunity isn't going to fix it. Only voters can solve that by saying clearly "no, this is not the agency we want."
If that is what the voters want, then the victim minority can only reconsider their role in the social contract.
I do not understand officers having qualified immunity. They are armed for of the government and they have much lower expectations placed on them the normal citizens.
The fact that cops can break laws, actually harm people and then make prosecution basically impossible is bonkers.
It’s a sticky issue. Without QI, it seems very plausible that many law enforcement departments would be seriously hamstrung by continual waves of legal action and thus cost taxpayers a lot more to operate effectively. Not only would many people use a court of law as a fallback from the court of public opinion, but the legal industry would support this given the lucrative monetary and reputational advantages of suing the government.
And I’m saying that as someone extremely pro-curtailment of police/TSA/CBP scope and resources, and extremely critical and aware of the law enforcement abuse and overreach epidemic. This one just doesn’t have an easy solve—not without a massive overhaul of the entire US justice system down to the roots.
Why now? Because in the past 2-3 years it has been made abundantly clear that:
(a) Social media operators choose to do nothing at all against coordinated influencing operations, unless the influencing goes against the interests of very specific countries and groups.
(b) US government most likely has unfettered access to social media data. As if this isn't bad enough, they will probably give them out to Palantir for "data integration" and under uncertain terms.
Those things were pretty clear well before 2-3 years.
Social media is seen as a driver for people having opinions deemed a threat to the status quo. Western governments have been fighting a long battle to use these tools to control domestic influence and at times have probably thought they were winning, but recently things seem to be turn a bit.
"Think of the children" is obviously the oldest and most pathetic trick in their playbook. We know it's a bald faced lie because data and studies on social media harms on children has been coming out for well over a decade by now, and not a finger was lifted for years. So we know that is not the reason, and we know they are lying about the reason. Therefore we know the real reason is seen as unpopular with the electorate. And curbing foreign (including US government) influence and access to data is not unpopular anywhere.
Hacienda is the most extractive Tax Agency in the world. They have lobbied for ever more intrusion into private lifes of citizens in order to extract more money. Thus they have included a "lifestyle auditing" that has access to many cross-databases, utilities, insurance, etc....
If you set up a system of ID identification linked to your real ID and IP, Hacienda (and the police, and eventually private companies) will be able to backtrack.
The current PM's rother, wife and half of his cabinet are involved in corruption scandals linked to COVID funds given to companies that bribed people. This is the government that will implement such efforts. Would you be able to trust them ?
Entirely different cases. Russia never relied on the strong rouble for its economy to function. Or having unfettered access to most of the world's markets. So it had some know-how on weathering the storm.
But OTOH, if Trump is erratic enough to trigger a world-wide de-dollarization trend, and close down markets that were traditionaly open (e.g. Europe), then US would be facing an unprecedented storm that would be much harder to navigate.
Deploying on Kubernetes using Helm solves a lot of these cases: Migrations are run at the init stage of the pods. If successful, pods of the new version are started one by one, while the pods of the new version are shutdown. For a short period, you have pods of both versions running.
When you add new stuff or make benign modifications to the schema (e.g. add an index somewhere), you won't notice a thing.
If the introduced schema changes are not compatible with the old code, you may get a few ProgramingErrors raised from the old pods, before they are replaced. Which is usually acceptable.
There are still some changes that may require planning for downtime, or some other sort of special handling. E.g. upgrading a SmallIntegerField to an IntegerField in a frequently written table with millions of rows.
A request not being served can happen for a multitude of reasons (many of them totally beyond your control) and the web architecture is designed around that premise.
So, if some of your pods fail a fraction of the requests they receive for a few seconds, this is not considered downtime for 99% of the use cases. The service never really stopped serving requests.
The problem is not unique to Django by any means. If you insist on being a purist, sure count it as downtime. But you will have a hard time even measuring it.
If an agency has shitty officers doing dodgy stuff, it's on the agency. The agents may be declared immune to direct litigation, but any claims and reparations should be automatically shifted to the agency.
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