Reclining seats are more expensive and heavier. The target customer for a low cost flight is cost sensitive and more resistant to "punishment". The expense would be hard to recuperate.
I still see ashtrays on older plans, trains, and boats. Sometimes older stuff is left there because it's not financially advantageous to replace it. You can use the recline button to your liking, but it can be inconsiderate to do it. Traveler discretion is advised.
A question you can always ask yourself is "should I do it just because I can do it?". It will stop you from being needlessly inconsiderate many times, and maybe even make you a better person.
> I'd rather expose a Wireguard port and control my keys than introduce a third party like Tailscale.
Ideal if you have the resources (time, money, expertise). There are different levels of qualifications, convenience, and trust that shape what people can and will deploy. This defines where you draw the line - at owning every binary of every service you use, at compiling the binaries yourself, at checking the code that you compile.
> I am not sure why people are so afraid of exposing ports
It's simple, you increase your attack surface, and the effort and expertise needed to mitigate that.
> It's the way the Internet is meant to work.
Along with no passwords or security. There's no prescribed way for how to use the internet. If you're serving one person or household rather than the whole internet, then why expose more than you need out of some misguided principle about the internet? Principle of least privilege, it's how security is meant to work.
Ah… I really could not disagree more with that statement. I know we don’t want to trust BigCorp and whatnot, but a single exposed port and an incomplete understanding of what you’re doing is really all it takes to be compromised.
Same applies to Tailscale. A Tailscale client, coordination plane vulnerability, or incomplete understanding of their trust model is also all it takes. You are adding attack surface, not removing it.
If your threat model includes "OpenSSH might have an RCE" then "Tailscale might have an RCE" belongs there too.
If you are exposing a handful of hardened services on infrastructure you control, Tailscale adds complexity for no gain. If you are connecting machines across networks you do not control, or want zero-config access to internal services, then I can see its appeal.
I'll take this to mean that you think arbitrary access to a computer's capabilities will require licensure, in which case I think this is a bad metaphor.
The point of a driver's license is that driving a ton of steel around at >50mph presents risk of harm to others.
Not knowing how to use a computer - driving it "poorly" - does not risk harm to others. Why does it merit restriction, based on the topic of this post?
1. "Unpatched servers become botnet hosts" - true, but Tailscale does not prevent this. A compromised machine on your tailnet is still compromised. The botnet argument applies regardless of how you access your server.
2. Following this logic, you would need to license all internet-connected devices: phones, smart TVs, IoT. They get pwned and join botnets constantly. Are we licensing grandma's router?
3. The Cloudflare point undermines the argument: "botnets cause centralization (Cloudflare), which is harm", so the solution is... licensing, which would centralize infrastructure further? That is the same outcome being called harmful.
4. Corporate servers get compromised constantly. Should only "licensed" corporations run services? They already are, and they are not doing better.
Back to the topic: I have no clue what you think Tailscale is, but it does increase security, only convenience.
The comment I was replying to was claiming that using your computer 'poorly' does not harm others. I was simply refuting that. Having spent the last two decades null routing customer servers when they decide to join an attack, this isn't theoretical.
As an aside, I dislike tailscale, and use wireguard directly.
Back to the topic: Your connected device can harm others if used poorly. I am not proposing licensing requirements.
Most inadequate drivers don't think they're inadequate, which is part of the problem. Unless your acquaintances are exclusively PMC you most likely know several adults who've lost their licenses because they are not adequately safe drivers, and if your acquaintances are exclusively PMC you most likely know several adults who are not adequately safe drivers and should've lost their licenses but knew the legal tricks to avoid it.
From the perspective of those writing the regs, speeding, running lights, driving carelessly or dangerously (all fines or crimes here) are indeed indicators of safe driving or not.
Understand, I am not advocating this. I said I did not like it. Neirher of those statements have anything totk do with whether I think it will come to pass, or not.
Even if you understand what you are doing, you are still exposed to every single security bug in all of the services you host. Most of these self hosted tools have not been through 1% of the security testing big tech services have.
Now you are exposed to every security bug in Tailscale's client, DERP relays, and coordination plane, plus you have added a trust dependency on infrastructure you do not control. The attack surface did not shrink, it shifted.
I run the tailscale client in it's own LXC on Proxmox. Which connects to nginx proxy manager also in it's own LXC, which then connects to Nextcloud configured with all the normal features (Passkeys, HTTPS, etc). The Nextcloud VM uses full disk encryption as well.
Any one of those components might be exploitable, but to get my data you'd have to exploit all of them.
You do not need to exploit each layer because you traverse them. Tailnet access (compromised device, account, Tailscale itself) gets you to nginx. Then you only need to exploit Nextcloud.
LXC isolation protects Proxmox from container escapes, not services from each other over the network. Full disk encryption protects against physical theft, not network attacks while running.
And if Nextcloud has passkeys, HTTPS, and proper auth, what is Tailscale adding exactly? What is the point of this setup over the alternative? What threat does this stop that "hardened Nextcloud, exposed directly" does not? It is complexity theater. Looks like defense in depth, but the "layers" are network hops, not security boundaries.
For every remote exploit and cloud-wide outage that has happened over the past 20 years my sshd that is exposed to the internet on port 22 has had zero of either. There were a couple of major OpenSSH bugs but my auto updater took care of that before I saw it on the news.
You can trust BugCorp all you want but there are more sshd processes out there than tailnets and the scrutiny is on OpenSSH. We are not comparing sshd to say WordPress here. Maybe when you don’t over engineer a solution you don’t need to spend 100x the resources auditing it…
If you only expose SSH then you're fine, but if you're deploying a bunch of WebApps you might not want them accessible on the internet.
The few things I self host I keep out in the open. etcd, Kubernetes, Postgres, pgAdmin, Grafana and Keycloak but I can see why someone would want to hide inside a private network.
Yeah any web app that is meant to be private is not something I allow to be accessible from the outside world. Easy enough to do this with ssh tunnels OR Wireguard, both of which I trust a lot more than anything that got VC funding. Plus that way any downtime is my own doing and in my control to fix.
SSH is TCP though and the outside world can initiate a handshake, the point being that wireguard silently discards unauthenticated traffic - there's no way they can know the port is open for listening.
Uh, you know you can scan UDP ports just fine, right? Hosts reply with an ICMP destination unreachable / port unreachable (3/3 in IPv4, 1/4 in IPv6) if the port is closed. Discarding packets won't send that ICMP error.
It's slow to scan due to ICMP ratelimiting, but you can parallelize.
(Sure, you can disable / firewall drop that ICMP error… but then you can do the same thing with TCP RSTs.)
Wireguard is explicitly designed to not allow unauthenticated users to do anything, whereas SSH is explicitly designed to allow unauthenticated users to do a whole lot of things.
This felt like it didn’t do your aim justice, “$X and an incomplete understanding of what you’re doing is all it takes to be compromised” applies to many $X, including Tailscale.
Headscale is only really useful if you need to manage multiple users and/or networks. If you only have one network you want to have access to and a small number of users/devices it only increases the attack surface over having one wireguard listening because it has more moving parts.
I set it up to open the port for few secs via port knocking. Plus another script that runs on the server that opens connections to my home ip addr doing reverse lookup to a domain my router updates via dyndns so devices at my home don’t need to port knock to connect.
I think the most important thing about Tailscale is how accessible it is. Is there a GUI for Wireguard that lets me configure my whole private network as easily as Tailscale does?
This is where using frontier models can help - You can have them assist with configuring and operating wireguard nearly as easily as you can have them walk you through Tailscale, eliminating the need for a middleman.
The mid-level and free tiers aren't necessarily going to help, but the Pro/Max/Heavy tier can absolutely make setting up and using wireguard and having a reasonably secure environment practical and easy.
You can also have the high tier models help with things like operating a FreePBX server and VOIP, manage a private domain, and all sorts of things that require domain expertise to do well, but are often out of reach for people who haven't gotten the requisite hands on experience and training.
I'd say that going through the process of setting up your self hosting environment, then after the fact asking the language model "This is my environment: blah, a, b, c, x, y, z, blah, blah. What simple things can I do to make it more secure?"
And then repeating that exercise - create a chatgpt project, or codex repo, or claude or grok project, wherein you have the model do a thorough interrogation of you to lay out and document your environment. With that done, you condense it to a prompt, and operate within the context where your network is documented. Then you can easily iterate and improve.
Something like this isn't going to take more than a few 15 minute weekend sessions each month after initially setting it up, and it's going to be a lot more secure than the average, completely unattended, default settings consumer network.
You could try to yolo it with Operator or an elevated MCP interface with your system, but the point is, those high tier models are sufficiently good enough to make significant self hosting easily achievable.
> Ideal if you have the resources (time, money, expertise). There are different levels of qualifications, convenience, and trust that shape what people can and will deploy. This defines where you draw the line - at owning every binary of every service you use, at compiling the binaries yourself, at checking the code that you compile.
Wireguard is distributed by distros in official packages. You don't need time, money and expertise to setup unattended upgrades with auto reboot on a debian or redhat based distro. At least it is not more complicated than setting an AI agent.
What about SMTP, IMAP(S), HTTP(S), various game servers parent mentioned have open ports for?
Having a single port open for VPN access seems okay for me. That's what I did, But I don't want an "etc" involved in what has direct access to hardware/services in my house from outside.
> I need to install a bunch of drivers from HP with dubious names, like sp1234
This is just how HP names their software deployment packages. Lenovo will have something like "u6chp70us17" or "83wo12ww". You go on your product's page, download the driver, install it. I understand complaining about a device that doesn't work out of the box, but about the name of the driver installer?
To be honest I've never seen an EliteBook that needed any drivers for the common components (I also own quite a few Elites, oldest from 2012), and in general any laptop that needed a touchpad driver to work in well over a decade. And I've played with a lot of different laptops, business models in particular. Not saying it doesn't happen, just that I don't think it's common.
I have two similar laptops, 840 g8 and 845 g8. The first is intel, the other amd.
The intel one had some kind of new touchpad, which doesn't work during the windows install. It was apparently some new thing introduced with intel's 11th gen, don't remember the specifics, but apparently other models had the same issue. Windows needs to connect to the internet to fetch drivers once installed, even 25h2 which I installed two weeks ago. Bonus points for the AMD ethernet dongle not being recognized, even though it's some random realtek, so I have to type my wifi password (my AP doesn't support wps). The AMD one works, even though the touchpads seem similar.
For a long time, the AMD's webcam didn't work. There's some USB doohickey that wasn't recognized (showed up with an exclamation point in device manager), and even installing all the drivers from HP's webpage didn't solve it. It solved itself somehow after some windows update two or three years later. Out of the box, it did have the webcam working, but the display brightness was somehow limited to "pretty dim". I was ready to write it off as just another crappy enterprise pc panel, but then I rebooted it into the bios and the thing burned a hole through my eyes. Installing windows manually fixed the backlight. Sleep on windows more often than not hangs for some reason, even now, 5 years in.
The intel had a long-standing issue with 4k output over its usb-c ports. At one point, installing the gpu driver from intel fixed it, but windows update would helpfully update it to an older, borken version. Nowadays we have 5k panels at work. I can only get 5k if the driver is initialized with the monitor connected. So if the screen goes to sleep, it won't run at 5k anymore when it wakes back up. Newer models don't seem to have this issue anymore.
Fortunately I'm only an occasional windows user, so don't care all that much. Everything worked perfectly under linux since day one, so apart from the comically bad display quality, I'm generally a happy camper.
> They like it given a chance. My daughters for example far prefer Linux to Windows.
The two topics are orthogonal. GP talks about "local computing" vs. "black box in the cloud", the difference between running it vs. using it. You're talking about various options to run locally, the difference between running it this way or that way.
Linux or Windows users probably understand basic computing concepts like files and a file system structure, processes, basic networking. Many modern phone "app" users just know what the app and device shows them, and that's not much. Every bit of useful knowledge is hidden and abstracted away from the user. They get nothing beyond what service the provider wants them to consume.
It's most certainly not. Phones connect to a cell tower even without a SIM to make emergency calls. The phone can still be tracked and it's not a difficult leap from there to identify the owner of the phone.
> the Gazan government strategically uses humans shields
This just means Israel knows they're hitting women and children every time they send a bomb their way.
> the majority of Palestinians still support starting this war
Palestine isn't a democracy with well documented preferences. Israel is though, so why don't you say that a majority of Israelis are fine with the killing of women and children in Gaza?
elcritch, you're beating around the bush but strongly suggesting there's a reasonable justification (not just an explanation) for killing women and children if it suits someone's needs. Does this apply just to Israel killing people in Gaza or universally valid? Because I distinctly remember the US going to war over WMD that never existed. So elcritch, are you saying US women and children are fair game now?
> there's a reasonable justification (not just an explanation) for killing women and children if it suits someone's needs
The Law of Armed Conflict specifies exactly when it considers such a reasonable justification to exist, which is not "never". You don't get to plop down women and children in front of military installations and go "neener neener" like you're a child on the school playground.
Sure Eli, and I'm sure you're not biased at all, but when you find so many "reasonable" reasons to kill thousands and thousands of civilians, women and children included, and you never ask yourself any questions, there's nothing more anybody else needs to know about you.
The comparison writes itself and when it doesn't, you make it obvious. You wouldn't be the first person who finds justification for something like this.
1) The average death per bomb was less than 1. Strikes mostly hit things which had already been evacuated.
2) When human shields get hit we blame the side that put them in harm's way, not the side that harmed them. Just look at the criminal trials in police actions--a hostage dies when SWAT hits a place, the murder rap lands on the person who took the hostage even if it turns out to be a police bullet in the hostage.
And your note about WMD--said WMD existed. On paper. We read the paper, didn't realize it was underlings lying to Saddam.
> a hostage dies when SWAT hits a place, the murder rap lands on the person who took the hostage even if it turns out to be a police bullet in the hostage.
The murder wrap doesn't fall on the SWAT shooter even when they shoot completely unarmed, innocent people, in their own home. So all your example says is that SWAT gets gets a free pass for murder no matter what. All it takes is for someone to anonymously say "LorenPechtel is a terrorist, he's planning to blow up some children at this address right now" and your chances are slim.
The other thing OP presents is very different from any eID scheme in terms of anonymity. You'd show an ID to a human at the counter and even if the seller stores your info somehow, it can't be linked to the token they sold to you. The required infrastructure is minimal and relatively simplistic. The only drawback is that being anonymous means it's easy to resell tokens.
An eID system links your real life identity to any use of the eID online. Anyone who thinks there's a math or technology that fixes this misses the fact that it's the trust in the humans (companies, institutions, governments) who operate these systems is misplaced. Math and technology are implemented by people so there are many opportunities to abuse these systems. And once in place I guarantee, without any shadow of doubt that sooner or later, fast or slow, it will be expanded to any online action.
I will take anonymity and the small minority of kids who will find a loophole to access some adult-only stuff over the inevitable overreach and abuse against the large majority of people whose every online move will be traced and logged.
> The only drawback is that being anonymous means it's easy to resell tokens.
That’s a pretty major flaw. These tokens will be sold with markup on black markets, rendering the whole system unfit for its intended purpose.
Additionally, in line of drawbacks, buying porn scratch cards will be stigmatised, because everyone will (think they) know what you’ll use them for. Are you comfortable doing it in front of your teenage child, neighbor, crush, grandma, or spouse?
> Math and technology are implemented by people so there are many opportunities to abuse these systems.
And yet we have functioning asymmetric cryptography systems that enable secure encryption for billions of people, despite malevolent actors having a clear incentive to subvert that, much more so than age verification tokens.
> […] the inevitable overreach and abuse against the large majority of people whose every online move will be traced and logged.
This is happening right now already, in a scale hardly imaginable.
> These tokens will be sold with markup on black markets,
Black markets catering to minors aren't very large or profitable. No adult needs to buy from this black market. How big is the black market for beer for teenagers? Yes, some reselling will happen, just as minors sometimes get alcohol or tobacco from older friends and siblings. Prosecute anyone involved. It doesn't have to be perfect. It just has to be good enough without sacrificing privacy.
> buying porn scratch cards will be stigmatised
There was once a time, in living memory, when people had Playboy and Hustler mailed to their houses. You're overthinking it. And also why would the seller assume it's for adult content instead of social media?
> Are you comfortable doing it in front of your teenage child, neighbor, crush, grandma, or spouse?
So don't do it in front of them? You're allowed to go to stores alone.
For people who have no money to spare for games it really doesn't matter if games come with DRM or not. They wouldn't afford them anyway so "for free" is the only option that matters.
For people who have money for games but don't want to pay, the presence of DRM matters very little. 99% of games are usually trivially cracked, especially if you are willing to wait for some days or weeks after launch (an important sales window for the publishers).
For people who have money for games and are willing to pay, DRM turns out to be maybe an inconvenience, but definitely a guarantee that they don't actually own the game. The game can be taken away or even just modified in a way that invalidates the reason people paid in the first place.
> especially if you are willing to wait for some days or weeks after launch (an important sales window for the publishers).
“Important” is an understatement. Even for long-term success stories, the first three or four months often accounts for half of a game’s revenue.
And, despite so many people theorizing that “pirates don’t have money and wouldn’t pay anyway”, in practice big publishers wait in dread of “Crack Day” because the moment the crackers release the DRMless version, the drop in sales is instant and dramatic.
When the Nintendo Switch became hackable, ie can play any game, Nintendo saw a massive decrease in sales in Spain. Btw people in Spain pirate the most games in Europe. The decrease was at least 40%. The idea that this is a service issue and piracy doesn’t affect sales is just PR speak. If the game is offline, it’ll be pirated a lot.
Both you and GGP make concrete claims but fail to provide evidence. Can anyone cite published sales data or is this all mere conjecture?
We've been exposed to what seems like FUD about piracy killing sales since approximately forever - you wouldn't dOwnLoAd a cAR - but seemingly zero actual evidence to date.
My source is first and second hand reports from management of game companies having worked in the industry for decades. But, they don’t make numbers like that public.
The best public report I can find is https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S18759... which shows a median difference 20% of revenue for games where Denuvo is cracked “quickly” but also no significant difference if Denuvo survives for at least 3 months.
What I’ve observed from internal reports from multiple companies is that, if you don’t assume an outlier blockbuster game, major game studios’ normal plan is to target a 10% annual profit margin with an expected variance of +/-20% each year.
So, assuming you have a solidly on-target game, DRM not just being there, but surviving at least a couple months is the difference between “10% profit moving the whole company forward on schedule” vs “10% loss dragging the whole company down” or “30% profit, great success, bonuses and hiring increases” depending on the situation.
Outside of games, I have seen many personnel reports on Hacker News over the years from small-time ISVs that they find it exhausting they need to regularly ship BS “My Software version N+1” just as an excuse to update their DRM. But, every time they do, sales go back up. And, the day the new crack appears on Pirate Bay, sales drop back down. Over and over forever. Thus why we can’t just buy desktop software anymore. Web apps are primarily DRM and incidentally convenient in other ways.
> which shows a median difference 20% of revenue for games where Denuvo is cracked “quickly” but also no significant difference if Denuvo survives for at least 3 months.
So how did they measure the difference? They released one title with Denuvo then erased everyone's memories about it and released it again without?
Because if you compare different titles I don't know what you base that percentage on.
I've been saying that for decades at this point. Web apps trade post-release support issues with slightly higher development costs upfront (dealing with browser compatibility), but the real kicker is that the company is now in complete control of who gets to use what and when.
It's a vacuous argument. Even in the complete absence of piracy web apps would still have won out over desktop software due to turning a one time sale into a recurring subscription. That's what drove their adoption.
MMOs show the same thing. There are plenty of multiplayer games with centralized servers that are effectively impossible to pirate. But subscription based MMOs score a clear win in terms of revenue.
(It turns out free to play gacha is even more lucrative than subscription, but I digress.)
> My source is first and second hand reports from management of game companies having worked in the industry for decades. But, they don’t make numbers like that public.
As an aside, I find this kind of behavior on the part of companies rather irritating. It's like, if you want people to believe that something affects your sales, you need to publicly release the sales data (and do so in a way that people will trust). Otherwise there's no reason for anyone to believe you're not just making stuff up.
They just need law makers to support IP/DRM laws that allow them to continue to operate. (I made games for a while at a small studio; I understand some of the pressures that studios are under and don’t support piracy of games.)
And they can get that support without publicly releasing detailed time-series sales data.
It doesn't add up though. If they were actually dependent on DRM as described then broad public support would be a massive benefit to them. Yet seemingly none of the many studios out there publicize such data. And this comment section is full of hand waving about "well I can't provide actual data but I talked to someone who said ..." it sure looks like BS to me.
when i was younger there were more games i wanted to play than i had money to pay for..and i pirated.
then i had some money and i bought more games than i had time to play.*
now i neither buy or play games.
*the point is that at this point, there is no point wasting time trying to pirate games. every humble bundle. every steam sale. u just click and its yours. you dont even have time to play. why waste time pirating?
Looks nice but nothing outstanding or particularly legible, compared to the many fonts developed for this purpose already. I think they wanted their own identity and there's nothing wrong with that. But the "designed for safety" part feels like a gimmick to tie into their branding.
Car manufacturers change their logo or font occasionally to send a message, solidify a brand identity, of course it won't be in any way related to any of the engineering of the car.
> Android Automotive. And I think touchscreens in cars are trash, and Android particularly so; the latency is horrendous
I don't own a Volvo but I've seen the infotainment system in action on their premium cars (XC60/XC90/EX90). If I were to be in the market for a new car in that category, the infotainment and "Volvo's close relationship with Google", to quote the article, would single handedly cross Volvo out from my list.
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